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5Abstract
Public good games reect the common conict between group interest and self interest:
While collaborative projects depend on joint eorts of all participants, each individual
performs best by free-riding on the others' contributions. In this thesis I use evolutionary
game dynamics to study the interplay of cooperation and incentives. I demonstrate that
rewards may act as a catalyst for individual contributions, while punishment is needed
to maintain mutual cooperation. In this process, reputation plays a key role: It helps to
mitigate the second-order free-rider problem and prevents subjects from being spiteful. In
contrast to previous studies, I do not nd that punishment can promote any behaviour (as
long as deviations from that norm are punished). Instead, sanctions are targeted at non-
cooperators only, and lead to stable cooperation.
Furthermore, this thesis provides some mathematical tools for the study of public good
games with incentives. It extends the theory of role games and it introduces a modied
replicator dynamcis that allows to investigate the consequences of local competition. Un-
der this local replicator dynamics, even dominated strategies may prevail if they lead to
a relative payo advantage { which can be considered as a basic model for the evolution
of spite.
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9Introduction
I nd it useful to distinguish between two dierent branches of evolutionary game the-
ory. The rst branch has its focus on evolution itself and the relevant question under this
perspective are:
How can we describe learning processes in strategic environments mathematically?
What can we say about the properties of such learning rules?
Research articles that have dealt with this kind of questions include the papers on ctitious
play (Robinson, 1951), the best response dynamics (Matsui, 1992) and the replicator
dynamics (Taylor and Jonker, 1978). In recent years, researchers are also increasingly
interested in the converse type of problem:
Are there learning rules that have a specic property?
Typical examples include the question whether learning processes for sequential games can
lead to the backward induction solution (for a positive answer see Hart, 2002) or whether
there is a reasonable evolutionary dynamics that leads to the extinction of dominated
strategies (for a negative answer, see Hofbauer and Sandholm, in press).
The second approach has its focus on the application of evolutionary game theory to
relevant economic or biological settings. One of the pioneering research articles of this
kind is also considered to be the birth of evolutionary game theory: The logic of animal
conict of Maynard Smith and Price (1973) provides a rationale for ritual ghting in deers.
Maybe the most popular application of evolutionary game theory deals with the evolution
of cooperation (Axelrod, 1984), considering the following type of questions:
Why do we nd so much cooperation in nature?
Which mechanisms enhance individual cooperativeness?
The rst question is motivated by several empirical ndings: Vampire bats regurgitate
blood to one another to increase the conspecic's chances of survival (Wilkinson, 1984)
and in cleaning symbioses, host shes refrain from eating their cleaner shes even if clean-
ing is over (see Trivers, 1971). Since evolutionary forces are predicted to select against
altruistic traits, scientists are interested in the mechanisms that uphold cooperation (see
for example Nowak, 2006b).
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The title of the thesis suggests that this monograph belongs to the second category of
evolutionary game theory and indeed, Chapter 2 and 4 investigate the question whether
positive and negative incentives can promote cooperative behaviour. However, in order
to respond to these questions, I needed to develop some mathematical tools that rather
belong to the rst branch of evolutionary game theory and these tools are presented as
Chapter 1 and 3. At rst sight, Chapter 5 seems to be a bit out of place because it neither
deals with the evolution of cooperation, nor does it provide a mathematical framework to
respond to such questions. Instead, this chapter emerged as a product of my research on
this thesis. When I tried to apply standard tools of evolutionary game theory to public
good games with incentives, I got several counterintuitive results that left me puzzled.
Chapter 5 is my attempt to resolve this puzzle.
Replicator dynamics
of role games
Chapter 1
Local replicator dynamics
Chapter 3
Mathematical tools Application to public good
games with incentives
Incentives and opportunism
Chapter 2
Cooperation and punishment
in non−anonymous societies
Chapter 4
Equilibrium notions and
framing effects
Chapter 5
Figure 1: A schematic overview of the thesis
Public good games with incentives
Microeconomics denes public goods as goods that are nonrival and non-excludable. Due
to non-rivalry, the consumption of the good by one individual does not aect the consump-
tion possibilities of all others and due to non-excludability, no one can be precluded from
using the good. Especially because of the latter property, public goods are vulnerable to
the free-rider problem: Since non-contributors cannot be excluded, there is no incentive
11
to engage in the provision of public goods. This may lead to the overuse of common re-
sources such as shing grounds (Hardin, 1968), to delayed actions against climate change
(e.g. Milinski et al., 2006) or to non-compliance to social norms (see Fehr and Gachter,
2000).
In order to test these predictions in the laboratory, behavioural economists have de-
signed a simple experimental situation that mimics the incentive structure of public goods.
Before the experiment starts, each of the four participants is endowed with a starting cap-
ital C. Then the subjects may decide anonymously which amount of their money they
want to spend to a public pool, knowing that all contributions to the pool are doubled
and shared equally among the participants. A theoretical analysis of this decision problem
is straightforward: If the contributions of a player are denoted by xi, then the player's
payo i can be calculated as
i = C   xi + 1
4
4X
k=1
2xk (1)
The optimal strategy of a player depends on the player's target function. A player i aiming
to maximize the group payo
P
j=1 j may compute
@
@xi
 X
j=1
j

= 1 > 0: (2)
Therefore, the group optimum is attained if all players contribute their full starting capital
C to the public pool (in which case all players obtain a payo of 2C). On the other hand,
a player aiming to maximize the individual payo i needs to calculate
@i
@xi
=  1=2 < 0: (3)
Consequently, the individual optimum is attained if the player withholds all contributions.
However, in a group of self-interested subjects, each player only yields the starting capital
C instead of the pareto ecient outcome of 2C. Public good games thus describe a
situation where individual interests are at odds with group welfare { a social dilemma.
In the laboratory, the result of such a game may be aected by a variety of parameters
(for a survey, see Ledyard, 1995): In fact, contributions depend on the starting capital,
group size, communication possibilities, whether the public pool is doubled or tripled or
on the (economic) education and gender of the participants. As a robust nding, most of
the subjects start by contributing around half of their endowment; however, if the public
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good game is repeated for several rounds, the players learn to behave selshly. In the last
round, 73% of all players contribute nothing (see Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
Such a negative outcome can be prevented if contributions are incentivized. Indeed, if
we assume that contributors yield subsidies that are proportional to their contributions,
we obtain the following payo function:
i = C   (1  r)xi + 1
4
4X
k=1
2xk; (4)
where r denotes the subsidy rate. According to this modied payo function, self-
interested individuals will contribute their full endowment if
@i
@xi
= r   1=2 > 0: (5)
Incentives thus may solve the social dilemma; however, without proper institutions pro-
viding these subsidies, it is unclear how such an incentive scheme can be implemented. In
a path-breaking experiment, Fehr and Gachter (2000) have shown that no exterior insti-
tution is needed, since subjects seem to be able to govern themselves. In this experiment,
players had the opportunity to punish their co-players after the public good game. It was
shown that players are willing to punish free-riders even if any personal long-run benet
for the punisher is excluded by the experimental design. As a consequence, contributions
to the public good were signicantly higher if sanctioning mechanisms were available.
From a game-theoretic perspective, this result is puzzling: Since punishment is costly,
there is no obvious incentive for the punisher to engage in retribution. A theoretical model
of the co-evolution of cooperation and punishment must therefore explain:
1) Which mechanisms ensure the maintenance of a punishment regime?
This question addresses a second-order free-rider problem: Since a sanctioning mechanism
is costly, but benecial for the group as a whole, it is a public good by itself. How
can players be incentivized to engage in the punishment of free-riders? This problem is
intensied in groups that fully consist of free-riders:
2) Which mechanisms promote the implementation of a punishment regime
in a population of free-riders?
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Finally, it needs to be claried how a punishment regime can be controlled since several
experiments indicate that a non-negligible fraction of subjects abuse sanctioning opportu-
nities for spite (see, for example Herrmann et al., 2008; Nikiforakis, 2008).
3) Which mechanisms prevent the evolution of anti-social punishment?
In the last ten years, several evolutionary explanations for the emergence of punishment
have been proposed { a short (and non-representative) survey is shown in Tab. 1. While
there are numerous mechanisms that guarantee the xation of punishment, it seems to be
more dicult to identify mechanisms that allow the initial implementation of a sanction-
ing regime. Most surprisingly, there is only one study (Rand et al., 2010) that allows for
anti-social punishment, and there the co-evolution of cooperation and punishment is fully
suppressed if subjects have the opportunity to be spiteful.
It is the aim of this thesis to demonstrate how non-anonymity can resolve all these
three questions. In the model presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, individuals adapt
to the reputation of their co-players and learn to cooperate against punishers. This in
turn provides an incentive to engage in costly punishment when necessary. It is shown in
Chapter 2 that in a population of non-cooperators, rewards may promote the emergence of
an ecient punishment regime when punishment alone cannot establish stable cooperation.
In Chapter 4 we investigate how reputation can prevent subjects from abusing sanctions
for spite and anti-social punishment.
In order to simplify the analysis, we consider public good games between two players
only. Such games can be represented as a role game, where players may have dierent
actions depending on their respective role in the current interaction. Role games are for-
mally introduced in Chapter 1, where we also discuss the basic properties of the replicator
dynamics of such games. Chapter 3 investigates the inuence of local competition on the
evolution of strategies. For this reason we derive a modied replicator dynamics, assuming
that players interact in nite groups of size N . According to this local replicator dynamics,
dominated strategies do not necessarily go extinct. Instead, a dominated strategy may
spread among the population if it gives a relative advantage to the focal player. One may
therefore interpret the local replicator dynamics as a model for the evolution of spite.
When I applied the Moran process (Nowak et al., 2004) to public good games with
incentives, I noticed a remarkable framing eect: Adding a new strategy to a game may
aect the game's result even if this new strategy is identical to a strategy that was already
14
Article Mechanism promoting
the invasion of
punishment
Mechanism promoting
the xation of
punishment
Antisocial
punishment
included?
Boyd and Richerson (1992)
Punishment allows the evolution of co-
operation (or anything else) in sizeable
groups
In repeated interactions,
punishment may invade if
it makes the co-players
more cooperative
Higher-order punishment Not explicitly
Gintis (2000)
Strong reciprocity and human sociality
Punishment cannot invade
when rare
Cooperative groups play
more rounds of the PGG
and hence obtain a higher
payo
No
Sigmund et al. (2001)
Reward and Punishment
Punishment cannot invade
when rare
Due to reputation,
subjects are more likely to
cooperate against
punishers
No
Boyd et al. (2003)
The evolution of altruistic punishment
Punishment cannot invade
when suciently rare
(within their group)
Group selection:
Cooperative groups are
more likely to replace
other groups
No
Gardner and West (2004a)
Cooperation and punishment, espe-
cially in humans
Punishment can invade if
there is a correlation
between punishment and
received cooperation
Punishment is stable if
there is a correlation
between punishment and
received cooperation
No
Fowler (2005)
Altruistic punishment and the origin
of cooperation
Voluntary participation Second-order punishment No
Nakamaru and Iwasa (2006)
The coevolution of altruism and pun-
ishment: Role of the selsh punisher
In nite populations,
severe punishment leads to
a relative tness
advantage
In nite populations,
severe punishment leads to
a relative tness
advantage
No
Hauert et al. (2007)
Via freedom to coercion: The emer-
gence of costly punishment
Voluntary participation Due to stochastic
uctuations, no strategy is
stable
No
Eldakar and Wilson (2008)
Selshness as second-order altruism
Punishment cannot invade
when rare
Coexistence of
non-punishing cooperators
and punishing defectors in
nite groups
No
Boyd et al. (2010)
Coordinated punishment of defectors
sustains cooperation and can prolifer-
ate when rare
Only possible if there is
some assortment in group
formation
Punishers coordinate their
activities, punishment
costs decrease
overproportionally with
the number of punishers
No
Rand et al. (2010)
Anti-social punishment can prevent
the co-evolution of punishment and co-
operation
Punishment cannot invade Punishment is not stable Yes
Table 1: A short history of evolutionary models on the co-evolution of cooperation
and punishment
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available to the players. Chapter 5 discusses solution concepts with this kind of fram-
ing eect and gives an unexpected condition for such inconsistencies: If a game-theoretic
solution concept depends dierentiably on the payos, then it also depends on the repre-
sentation of the game.
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Chapter 1
The replicator dynamics of role
games
Abstract
In a role game, two players interact in an asymmetric game with both players having equal
chance to be the row-player or the column-player. After reviewing previous results on role
games and their replicator dynamics, we proceed by analyzing the special case where
the row-player can choose among three pure actions and the column-player among two.
We identify cases where the dynamics degenerates to the dynamics of a reduced game,
but we also give a numerical example where the system exhibits non-trivial cycles and
where strategies are sustained in the population that are not part of any Nash equilibrium
of the game. In addition, we prove a general result for mixed equilibria in non-generic
two-player games: If the row-player randomizes between k pure actions, then so does the
column-player.
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1.1 Introduction
In game theory, it is common to distinguish between symmetric and asymmetric games.
In symmetric games, players are assumed to be undistinguishable and all agents have the
same set of available strategies and face the same monetary consequences, as for example
in the prisoner's dilemma. In asymmetric games, on the other hand, strategies and feasible
payos may dier across agents. For example, traders have dierent strategies than their
customers, and the possible payos of a hunting predator dier from the payos of its
prey.
Role games are somewhat between these two categories (Gaunersdorfer et al., 1991;
Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Berger, 2001). While the actual game itself (the so-called
base game) is generally asymmetric and the payos and strategies depend on the player's
role in the game, it is assumed that each player has equal chances to act in a given role,
making the interaction implicitly symmetric. For example, in online trading systems such
as ebay, a subject may be in the role of the seller at one time and in the role of the buyer
at another time. Similarly, in innerspecic territory conicts (Maynard Smith, 1982),
an animal may sometimes be in the role of the owner and sometimes in the role of the
intruder. In such games, players can condition their strategies on their present role.
The prime example for a role game is the ultimatum game (Guth et al., 1982), which
was one of the rst experimental games demonstrating the irrelevance of backward in-
duction in human decision making. The protocol of the ultimatum game assumes that
subjects are assigned in pairs. In each pair, one of the subjects is randomly determined
to be in the role of the proposer, whereas the other subject is in the role of the respon-
der. The proposer is asked to make an oer how to split a certain amount of money
between them. The responder can then either accept this split or reject it, in which case
both subjects obtain nothing. Although payo-maximizing responders should accept any
positive amount, oers below 20 % of the total are frequently rejected (see for example
Camerer and Fehr, 2006). There have been several evolutionary approaches to rationalize
this outcome. Nowak et al. (2000) interpret this result as the subject's attempt to build
up a strict reputation (which can be benecial in future encounters). Such a behaviour
is, of course, ill-suited for the anonymous conditions in the laboratory, but it might have
played an important role in our evolutionary history. Gale et al. (1995) explain the devi-
ation from backward induction by introducing noise in the decision making process.1 If
1Note, however, that only Nowak et al. (2000) treat the ultimatum game as a role game where players
may nd themselves in both roles. Gale et al. (1995), on the other hand, interpret the game as an asym-
metric game with two distinct populations, a population of proposers and and a population of responders.
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responders are more often subject to noise, then replicator dynamics can lead to a Nash
equilibrium that predicts zero-oers to be rejected.
The replicator dynamics of role games was also used to explain cooperative behaviour
under the presence of incentives (Sigmund et al., 2001; De Silva and Sigmund, 2009).
In these studies, the player in the role of the donor needs to decide whether or not to
transfer a benet b to the recipient (at own costs c). If the donor refuses to cooperate, the
recipient may engage in punishment, by reducing the donor's payos by some amount .
Recently, this cooperation game was extended to include the possibility of rewards (Hilbe
and Sigmund, 2010). This additional option increases the recipient's strategy space and
therefore requires to study the dynamics of higher dimensional systems. It is therefore the
aim of this chapter to extend the general theory of role games. As a special case, we study
the dynamics of games where one player may choose among two actions (for example, to
cooperate or to defect) and where the other player can choose among three actions (to
punish a defector, to reward a cooperator or to do nothing). We nd that in most cases,
the replicator dynamics of such a role game degenerates to a game of lower dimension
(where at least one pure action of the subjects is never used). However, we also give a
numerical example for a game where all actions persist in the population, even those that
are not part of any Nash equilibrium of the game.
Parts of our analysis of role games will somewhat resemble the studies of Cressman
et al. (2000) and Chamberland and Cressman (2000) on the dynamics of games with two
independent decisions. In their model, two subjects play one of two possible symmetric
games against each other, with nature determining randomly which game they play. While
the players in role games condition their actions on their present role in an asymmetric
game, the subjects in Cressman et al. (2000) and Chamberland and Cressman (2000)
can condition their strategies on the symmetric game that was chosen by nature. The
mathematical treatment of these two distinct approaches is quite similiar and we will
transfer some of their results to our setting.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In the next section, we introduce
role games formally and study their Nash equilibria. As a corollary, we prove that equilibria
for asymmetric games require the two players to randomize between the same number of
strategies. Thereafter, in Section 1.3, we dene the replicator equation of a role game
and establish some properties of the resulting dynamics. These results are then applied
to the case of 2  2-games (Section 1.4) and 3  2-games (Section 1.5). In Section 1.6,
we generalize the replicator equation to study the eect of recombination and in the last
section, we give a brief discussion of our results.
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1.2 Role games and equilibrium behaviour
Role games can be described as follows: Before the game starts, one of the two players
is randomly determined to be the row-player, whereas the other player is determined to
be the column-player. Thereafter, both subjects play a simultaneous game, which will
be called the base game. The row-player may choose an action among the nite set
fe1; : : : ; emg and the column-player may choose among the nite set ff1; : : : ; fng. Then,
depending on their respective choices, each player yields a payo that is given by the
following bimatrix (A;B). As usual, the rst entry in the bimatrix denotes the payo of
the row-player, whereas the second entry gives the payo for the column-player.0BBBB@
f1 : : : fn
e1 (a11; b11) : : : (a1n; b1n)
...
...
. . .
...
em (am1; bm1) : : : (amn; bmn)
1CCCCA (1.1)
In the base game, players are allowed to randomize between their pure actions. Let p 2 m
denote a probability vector, where pi is the probability that the row-player chooses the
pure action ei. Let q 2 n be the corresponding probability vector for the column-player.
In this case, the row-player's payo can be calculated as p Aq, whereas the column-player
obtains p Bq.
In the role game, each player needs to specify how to act in each role. Therefore, a
pure strategy of the role game is a pair [ei; fj ]. A mixed strategy for the role game is
represented by a matrix (xij) 2 mn. There is a natural correspondence between mixed
strategies x in the role game and pairs of mixed actions [p(x); q(x)] in the base game, by
dening pi(x) =
Pn
j xij and qj(x) =
Pm
i xij . This means that p(x) and q(x) are just the
marginal probabilities of x. Of course, this correspondence is not injective; however, it can
be easily seen that the correspondence is surjective, for example by dening xij = pi  qj .
In order to specify payos for the role game, we assume that each player has equal chance
to be in one of the two roles. Then, a subject with strategy x, interacting with a co-player
with strategy y yields the payo
(x; y) :=
1
2
p(x) Aq(y) + 1
2
p(y) Bq(x): (1.2)
In the special case that both players use pure strategies, x = [ei; fj ] and y = [ek; fl],
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expression (1.2) simplies to
ij;kl :=
1
2
ail +
1
2
bkj : (1.3)
In this section, we want to examine equilibrium behaviour in role games. It is well-
known that the Nash equilibria of a role game are strongly related to the Nash equilibria
of the underlying base game (see for example Berger (2001)). The proof of the following
Proposition follows the lines of Sigmund (2010).
Proposition 1 (Nash equilibria in role games)
The mixed strategy x^ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the role game if and only if
[p^; q^] = [p(x^); q(x^)] is a Nash equilibrium of the base game.
Proof. Suppose x^ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the role game. This means that
(y; x)  (x; x) for all y 2 mn. By Eq. (1.2) this implies
p(y) Aq^ + p^ Bq(y)  p^ Aq^ + p^ Bq^ for all y 2 mn (1.4)
Because the map y 7! [p(y); q(y)] is surjective, it follows that
p Aq^ + p^ Bq  p^ Aq^ + p^ Bq^ for all p 2 m; q 2 n (1.5)
For p = p^, this yields
p^ Bq  p^ Bq^ for all q 2 n; (1.6)
whereas q = q^ leads to
p Aq^  p^ Aq^ for all p 2 m: (1.7)
Hence, p^ is a best reply to q^ in the underlying base game, and vice versa. To show the
converse direction, suppose that x^ is not a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the role game.
This means that there is a y 2 mn such that (y; x) > (x; x), or again by Eq. (1.2):
p(y) Aq^ + p^ Bq(y) > p^ Aq^ + p^ Bq^ (1.8)
In this case, it follows that either p(y) Aq^ > p^ Aq^ or that p^ Bq(y) > p^ Bq^, which proves
that [p^; q^] is not a Nash equilibrium of the underlying base game.
This Proposition can be used to prove existence of Nash equilibria for general 2-player
games. For example, in Sigmund (2010) it is shown that every symmetric 2-player game has
a symmetric equilibrium. If this result is applied to a role game it follows by Proposition 1,
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that also the (potentially asymmetric) base game has a Nash equilibrium.
We next want to study under which conditions we may expect Nash equilibria where
both players make use of all their strategies. For a vector v we write v > 0 if all entries
vi > 0. Furthermore, we say that a game (A;B) is generic if the rows of A and the
columns of B are linearly independent. It is easily seen that the set of generic games
has full measure with respect to the Lebesgue measure on Rmn  Rmn. The following
Proposition is, to the best of my knowledge, new.
Proposition 2 (A necessary condition for a Nash equilibrium with full support)
Let [p^; q^] 2 mn be a Nash equilibrium for a generic game (A;B). If p^ > 0 and q^ > 0
then m = n.2
Proof. Assume to the contrary that (without loss of generality) m > n. Because [p^; q^] is
a Nash equilibrium with full support, it follows that each of the row-player's strategies
yields the same payo:
(Aq^)i   (Aq^)1 =
nX
l=1
(ail   a1l)  q^l = 0 for all 2  i  m: (1.9)
Together with the condition
Pn
l=1 q^l = 1, Eqs. (1.9) form a system ofm linear equations in
n unknowns. Since the rows of A are linearly independent, this system has no solution.
Both previous Propositions together imply that, generically, a role game can only have
an equilibrium in the interior of the state space if the underlying base game is square.
Note that the converse result to Proposition 2 is also true: If m = n, then the set of games
(A;B) with an interior equilibrium has positive Lebesgue measure. Indeed, the base game
(A^; A^T ), with a^ij = 1 if j  i = 1 mod n and a^ij = 0 otherwise, has a unique equilibrium
(p^; p^), where p^ = (1=n; : : : ; 1=n). By continuity, also games (A;B) that are in a suciently
small neighborhood of (A^; A^T ) have an equilibrium in the interior of the state space.
Furthermore, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3 (On the number of strategies supported by mixed equilibria)
Consider a generic two-player game (A;B). If, in equilibrium, the row-player mixes be-
2It seems to me that this result is a game-theoretic analogon to the exclusion principle from population
ecology (see, for example Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). Consider a situation where m dierent species
feed from n dierent resources. According to the exclusion principle there is no equilibrium with m > n.
Such a principle can be deduced from the Lotka-Volterra equations and the proof is in fact similar to the
proof we give for this Proposition.
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tween k pure strategies, then so does the column-player.
Proof. Follows immediately by the previous Proposition by considering the reduced game
( ~A; ~B), which originates from (A;B) by deleting all rows and columns that are not played
in equilibrium.
1.3 Replicator dynamics for role games
In the remainder of this chapter, we follow the evolutionary interpretation of game the-
ory. We consider an innite population of individuals, playing a role game (A;B). Each
member of the population is assumed to play a pure strategy. Under this interpretation,
xij denotes the fraction of players who use the strategy [ei; fj ]. As before, we denote the
marginal distributions by p(x) and q(x), that is pi(x) =
Pn
j xij denotes the fraction of
ei-players in the population, whereas qj(x) =
Pm
i xij gives the fraction of fj-players. If
x = (xij) is the current state of the population, then the expected payo for a player with
strategy [ei; fj ] becomes
ij = ij(x) =
X
k;l
ij;kl  xkl = 1
2
 
Aq(x)

i
+
1
2
 
p(x)TB

j
: (1.10)
Summing up over all strategies yields the following average payo of the whole population:
 = (x) =
X
i;j
ij  xij = 1
2
 p(x)T (A+B)q(x) (1.11)
We assume that the evolution of the system is governed by the replicator dynamics (Taylor
and Jonker, 1978; Zeeman, 1980). That is, we assume that the growth rate of strategy
[ei; fj ] is proportional to the payo dierential ij   . Thus, we consider the ordinary
dierential equation (ODE)
_xij = xij  [ij   ] : (1.12)
The analytical properties of ODE (1.12) are well understood, standard references are
Weibull (1995), Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) and Hofbauer and Sigmund (2003). The
following Lemma is a straightforward application of these known results to our specic
setting:
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Lemma 4 (Some analytical properties of the replicator dynamics for role games)
For a role game (A;B), let x(t) be a solution of the replicator equation.
(i) If the row-player's strategy ei is dominated, then pi(t) ! 0 (i.e., xij(t) ! 0 for all
j). Analogously, if the column-player's strategy fj is dominated, then qj(t)! 0.
(ii) If (A;B) is generic and m 6= n, then all orbits starting in the interior of the state
space mn converge to the boundary.
(iii) Adding a constant c to a column of A or to a row of B does not alter the dynamics.
Proof. (i) If ei is dominated then there is a strategy ek such that ail < akl for all l. It
follows that
_ xij
xkj

=
xij
xkj
 [ij   kj ] = xij
xkj

"
nX
l
ail   akl
2
ql
#
 0; (1.13)
with equality if and only if xij = 0. This proves that xij(t)=xkj(t)! 0 monotonically,
and since xkj(t) is bounded, the result follows.
(ii) According to Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998), all orbits x(t) converge to the boundary
if there is no rest point in int(mn). Because rest points in the interior are Nash
equilibria, the result follows from Proposition 2.
(iii) Adding a constant c to each entry of the j-th column of A increases the payo of all
players uniformly by cqj(x), and thus leaves the payo dierential ij  unchanged.
We next want to study the geometry of the state space under replicator dynamics.
Thereby, we closely follow the approach of Cressman et al. (2000). First, we note that for
any initial population x(0) 2 int(mn),
Zij =
x11  xij
x1j  xi1 (1.14)
is an invariant of motion for all 1  i  m and 1  j  n. Indeed, by deriving expression
(1.14), we obtain
_Zij = Zij  [11 + ij   1j   i1]
= Zij 
P
k;l(a1l + bk1 + ail + bkj   a1l   bkj   ail   bk1)=2  xkl = 0:
(1.15)
Furthermore, for 1 < i  m and 1 < j  n, all Zij are independent: Given the frequencies
in the rst row x1l and in the rst column xk1, each Zij uniquely determines the value
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of xij . Therefore, if we x an ordered set Z of (m   1)(n   1) initial conditions, Z =
Zij > 0
 1 < i  m; 1 < j  n	, then WZ  mn is an invariant submanifold, where
WZ =

x 2 int(mn)  x1jxi1 = Zijx11xij ; Zij 2 Z	 : (1.16)
Thus, the interior of the state space mn foliates into (n+m  2){dimensional manifolds
invariant under (1.12). Next we dene a map  that gives the marginal distributions for
each x 2WZ , that is  :WZ ! int(m n) is given by (x) = (p(x); q(x)). Without a
proof, we mention the following result from Cressman et al. (2000):
Proposition 5 (Geometry of the state space)
 is a dieomorphism, implying that each invariant submanifold WZ is dieomorph to
int(m n).
In particular, it follows that if there is an ordered set Z^ such that WZ^ contains a rest
point of Eq. (1.12), then all manifolds WZ contain such a rest point. In the case where all
Zij = 1, we obtain the Wright manifold
W1 =

x 2 int(mn)  x1jxi1 = x11xij ; 1 < i  m; 1 < j  n	 : (1.17)
On the Wright manifold, the decisions in the two roles are statistically independent, xij =
pi(x)  qj(x). In this case, if the strategy [ei; fj ] becomes extinct and if the fraction of
players using ei is bounded away from zero, then qj(x)! 0. This result can be extended
to all manifolds WZ :
Lemma 6 (Extinction Lemma)
Let x(t) be a solution of the replicator equation on some manifold WZ . Suppose there is
an " > 0 such that for all t we have qj
 
x(t)

> " for some j. Then xij(t)! 0 if and only
if pi
 
x(t)
! 0.
Proof. Because xij  pi(x), the "if"-direction is trivial. To show the converse direction,
we renumber the strategies such that i = 1 and j = 1. Let
z := min

Zkl
1  k  m; 1  j  n	 > 0: (1.18)
By Eq. (1.14), we have x11xkl = Zklx1lxk1 for all k; l. Summing up over 1  k  m and
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1  j  n thus leads to
x11 =
X
k;l
Zklx1lxk1  z  p1q1: (1.19)
Because z  q1 is bounded away from zero, the result follows.
In the following sections, we apply these results to give a classication of two special
cases. We start by reviewing the case of 22-games (see also Gaunersdorfer et al. (1991);
Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998); Berger (2001)) and then we proceed to 3 2-games.
1.4 The replicator dynamics of 2 2 games
In the simplest case, each player has two pure actions in the base game. The state space
of the corresponding role game takes the form of a tetrahedron and each invariant sub-
manifold
WZ =

x 2 int(4)  x12x21 = Z  x11x22; Z > 0	 (1.20)
is dieomorph to a square (see Fig. 1.1). Without loss of generality (see lemma 4iii) we
may assume that the game (A;B) has the following payo matrix: 
( 0 ; 0 ) ( 0 ; b12)
(a21; 0 ) (a22; b22)
!
(1.21)
Note that this payo matrix is chosen such that the rst strategy, [e1; f1] obtains a constant
payo of zero. Depending on the values a21; a22; b12 and b22, we can distinguish between
three dierent scenarios:
(1) Dominance: If a21a22 > 0 or if b12b22 > 0, then one of the pure actions in the base
game is dominated. By lemma 4i, replicator dynamics leads to the extinction of this
action and the game degenerates to a 2  1 game. In this case, there is a unique
strategy [ei; fj ] that is globally stable (see Fig. 1.2i, 1.2ii).
If both, a21a22 < 0 and b12b22 < 0, then the underlying base game has a unique Nash
equilibrium (p^; q^) in the interior of the state space, where
p^ =
1
b22   b12 
 
b22; b12

; q^ =
1
a22   a21 
 
a22; a21

: (1.22)
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[e1,f1]
[e2,f1] [e2,f2]
[e1,f2]
Figure 1.1: The state space of a role game involving the four strategies [e1; f1],
[e1; f2], [e2; f1] and [e2; f2]. The corners of the three-dimensional simplex correspond
to the homogeneous populations using that strategy, the interior points denote mixed
populations. For each initial state, the evolution of the system is restricted to a
two-dimensional saddle-like manifold that can be represented by a square.
i) Dominance D1 ii) Dominance D2 iii) Bistability B iv) Cyclic case C
[e1,f1] [e1,f2]
[e2,f2][e2,f1]
[e1,f1] [e1,f2]
[e2,f2][e2,f1]
[e1,f1] [e1,f2]
[e2,f2][e2,f1]
[e1,f1] [e1,f2]
[e2,f2][e2,f1]
Figure 1.2: Possible scenarios for the replicator dynamics of 22 role games. i) All
orbits converge monotonically to the only undominated strategy [e2; f2]. ii) Replicator
dynamics leads to the extinction of f1, leading to [e2; f2] thereafter. iii) There are
two evolutionarily stable strategies and an unstable equilibrium in the interior. iv)
Depending on the manifold WZ , orbits are periodic, converge to the xed point or
converge to the boundary. All graphs show the dynamics on the Wright manifold,
Z = 1.
Therefore, for the corresponding role game there is a unique interior Nash equilibrium x^Z
on each invariant manifold WZ which can be written as
x^Z =
1
(a22   a21)(b22   b12) 
 
a22b22 + Z  a21b22   Z
 a22b12   Z a21b12 + Z
!
; (1.23)
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where the parameter Z is chosen such that x^Z 2 WZ . Note that Z = 0 implies that x^z
is on the Wright-manifold. If there is such an interior equilibrium, we have the following
two additional scenarios:
(2) Bistability: If a21b12 > 0, then the interior xed point x^ is a saddle and each orbit
converges to one of the two asymptotically stable xed-points at the boundary,
see Fig. 1.2iii.
(3) Cyclic case: If a21b12 < 0, then the interior xed point x^ is a focus and there is
no xed point at the boundary. The asymptotic behaviour of the system depends
on the initial conditions. On the Wright-manifold W1 all orbits are periodic and
x^ is stable but not asymptotically stable (Fig. 1.2iv). For Z > 1 the xed point
is a spiral sink whereas for Z < 1, orbits converge to the heteroclinic cycle at the
boundary (or vice versa), see Gaunersdorfer et al. (1991).
For the cyclic case it will prove useful to determine an expression for the time averages
of the orbits. If the orbits do not converge to the boundary, such an expression can be
derived easily (see also Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, for an analogous expression in the
case of the Lotka-Volterra equation).
Proposition 7 (Time averages of interior orbits)
Consider a base game (A;B) with a unique Nash equilibrium [p^; q^] in the interior of the
state space nn. Let x(t) be a solution of the replicator equation for the corresponding
role game. If there is an " such that xij(t) > " for all i; j and t, then
lim
!1
1

Z 
0
p
 
x(t)

dt = p^ (1.24a)
lim
!1
1

Z 
0
q
 
x(t)

dt = q^ (1.24b)
Proof. Let us rst rewrite the replicator equation (1.12) as (log xij _) = ij(x)   (x).
Integration from 0 to  and division by  leads to
log xij()  log xij(0)

=
1

Z 
0

ij
 
x(t)
   x(t)dt 8i; j 8: (1.25)
Since xij is bounded away from zero, we may pass to the limit  !1,
0 = lim
!1
1

Z 
0

ij
 
x(t)
   x(t)dt 8i; j: (1.26)
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In particular, because we may normalize payos such that 11
 
x(t)

= 0 for all t, we may
conclude that
lim
!1
1

Z 
0

 
x(t)

dt = 0: (1.27)
Eq. (1.26) thus implies that
lim
!1
1

Z 
0
ij
 
x(t)

dt = lim
!1
1

Z 
0
kl
 
x(t)

dt 8i; j; k; l; (1.28)
which is, due to the linearity of payos according to (1.10), equivalent to 
Aq

i
=
 
Aq

k 
pTB

j
=
 
pTB

l
8i; j; k; l (1.29)
where p = lim!1 1
R 
0 p
 
x(t)

dt and q = lim!1 1
R 
0 q
 
x(t)

dt. Eqs. (1.29) are exactly
the conditions for Nash equilibria and since x(t) is bounded away from zero, it follows
that (p; q) 2 int(n n). Therefore, p = p^ and q = q^.
However, in the case that orbits converge to a heteroclinic cycle, we cannot expect to
obtain similar expressions for the time averages. In fact, as shown in Gaunersdorfer (1992)
and Sigmund (1992), the time averages fail to converge to a single point because the time
that an orbit spends near a xed point increases exponentially for such orbits. Instead the
accumulation points of the time averages form a polygon, as described in Gaunersdorfer
(1992). We will return to this point in the following section.
1.5 The replicator dynamics of 3 2 games
For m = 3 and n = 2, the interior of the state space 6 foliates into the 3{dimensional
invariant manifolds
WZ =

x 2 int(6)  x12x21 = Z22  x11x22; x12x31 = Z32  x11x32; Z22; Z32 > 0	 (1.30)
By Proposition 5, each WZ is dieomorph to int(
3  2) and the invariant manifolds
can be represented by a prism (see Fig. 1.3). The boundary of the prism consists of three
squares (which correspond to the case where one of the row-player's strategies is absent,
that is we have a 2  2{game) and of two triangles (which correspond to the case where
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one of the two column-player's strategies is absent in the population). By lemma 4ii,
generically there is no xed point in the interior of this prism and all orbits converge to
the boundary. Without loss of generality, we suppose that the payo matrix is given by0B@ ( 0 ; 0 ) ( 0 ; b12)(a21; 0 ) (a22; b22)
(a31; 0 ) (a32; b32)
1CA (1.31)
The dynamics at the edges of the prism depends on the relative magnitudes of the aij and
on the signs of the bij , respectively (as depicted in Fig. 1.3).
f2
e2
e3
f1
a32>0
a21>a31
e1
a21<0
b32>0
b12<0
Figure 1.3: The invariant manifoldsWK can be represented by a prism. The corners
of this prism correspond to homogenous populations [ei; fj ] and the boundary surfaces
correspond to 2  2{games and 3  1{games, respectively. Each arrow depicts an
inequality for the payo values; the present example represents a game with a31 <
a21 < 0; 0 < a22 < a32 and b12 < 0; b22 > 0; b32 > 0.
We characterize the dynamics of 32 role games by considering all possible combinations
for the directions at the edges. With respect to the actions of the column-player, f1 and
f2, we may distinguish between two cases:
(i) One of the column-player's actions is dominated (in which case we may assume that
the dominated action is f1, that is b12; b22; b32 > 0). Furthermore, possibly after
renumbering of the strategies of the row-player, we may assume that a31 < a21 < 0.
This case is depicted in Fig. 1.4a. For the remaining payo values a12 = 0, a22
and a32 (which determine the orientation of the back triangle), there are 3! possible
orderings, leading to 6 possible subcases.
(ii) If none of the column-player's actions is dominated, we may assume that b12 < 0
whereas b22 > 0 and b32 > 0, see Fig. 1.4b{d. For the front triangle, there are { up
to symmetry { three possible orientations. Because of the 6 possible orientations of
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 1.4: Possible orientations of the prism. There are two main cases: Either
all arrows that are not part of a triangle point in the same direction, or one of the
three arrows points in the opposite direction. In the rst case, we may assume that
the front triangle is oriented as in (a), whereas in the second case there are, up to
symmetry, 3 dierent orientations of the front triangle (b-d).
the back triangle, this yields 18 possible subcases.
Overall, this leads to 24 dierent cases and a rough classication is shown in Fig. 1.5.
In 21 of the 24 cases, at least one of the actions in the base game is dominated and the
32-game degenerates to a game with lower dimension. In particular, in the cases (a){(o),
any orbit starting in int(32) converges to a uniquely determined vertex of the prism.
In the cases (p){(r), every orbit in the interior converges to a boundary face with bistable
competition. Therefore, almost all orbits are attracted by one of the two asymptotically
stable vertices. Eventually, in the cases (s){(u), every inner orbit converges to a unique
boundary face with cyclic behaviour.
Let us now turn to the non-degenerated cases without dominated strategies. In the rst
such case (see Fig. 1.5v) we have a bistable competition between two evolutionarily stable
strategies, [e1; f1] and [e3; f2]. In the other two cases, Fig. 1.5w,x, we need to determine
the stability of boundary faces with cyclic orbits. Let us therefore x an invariant manifold
WZ and denote by F
i the corresponding boundary face where the row-player's strategy ei
is absent, that is F i = bd(WZ) \ fpi(x) = 0g. Graphically, Fi corresponds to the square
opposite to the ei-edge. In order to determine the stability of such a boundary face, we
call F i saturated if
lim
!1
1

Z 
0
ij
 
x(t)

dt < lim
!1
1

Z 
0

 
x(t)

dt (1.32)
for all j and all orbits x(t) 2 int(F i). Condition (1.32) ensures that the absent strategy
ei yields a lower long-run payo than the residents for any initial population in int(F
i).
The following proposition establishes a relation between the stability of a boundary face
F i and the stability of xed points x^i 2 int(F i) :
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There is a dominated fi.
a) D1D1D1 b) D1D1D2 c) D2D1D2
d) D2D2D2 e) D2D2D1 f) D1D2D1
g) D2D2D1 h) D2D2D2 i) D2D2D1
There is a dominated
ei and the remaining
22-game has a unique
globally stable equilib-
rium.
j) D2D2D1 k) D2BD1 l) D2CD1
m) D2D2D2 n) D2BD2 o) CD2D2
Figure 1.5: A classication of 32 role games (Part 1): The 15 cases where one pure
strategy, which is marked by a black circle, is globally stable. The letters D1, D2, B
and C denote the dynamics on the 2 2-boundary-faces (Dominance, bistability and
cycles, see Fig. 1.2).
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There is a dominated
ei and the remaining
2  2-game exhibits
bistable competition.
p) BD2D2 q) D2BD1 r) BBD1
There is a dominated
ei and the remaining
2  2-game exhibits
evolutionary cycles.
s) CD2D1 t) CD2D2 u) CCD1
There is no dominated
strategy.
v) Bistability
BBD2
w) Two Cycles
CCD2
x) ESS vs. Cycle
CBD2
Figure 1.5: A classication of 3 2 role games (Part 2).
Proposition 8 (A condition for saturated boundary faces)
Suppose there is a unique xed point x^i 2 int(F i). If x^i is a (Lyapunov) stable Nash
equilibrium, then F i is saturated.
Proof. Follows immediately from Proposition 7.
In particular, it follows for the cases of Fig. 1.5w,x, that orbits starting suciently
close to a cyclic boundary face Fi will eventually converge to F
i if the corresponding xed
point x^i is a stable Nash equilibrium. However, the previous proposition does not make a
statement about boundary faces F i with heteroclinic orbits. In such a case, the following
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numerical example suggests that the dynamics may be non-trivial:3
Example 9 (The case of unstable xed points)
Consider the following game M (which is of the type depicted as Fig. 1.5w) with initial
population x0:
M =
0B@ 0; 0 0; 0:180:23; 0  0:09; 0:96
0:92; 0  0:37; 0:27
1CA ; x0 =
0B@ 0:26 0:50:06 0:14
0:02 0:02
1CA (1.33)
Plugging the values of x0 into expression (1.14) leads to Z22  0:82 and Z32  1:92. The
respective xed points on the boundary surfaces can be calculated according to Eq. (1.23):
x^2 
0B@ 0:14 0:460 0
0:15 0:25
1CA ; x^3 
0B@ 0:24 0:600:04 0:12
0 0
1CA (1.34)
None of these xed points is stable and orbits on F 2 and F 3 converge to the boundary.
By the index theorem (see Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998), only one of the xed points
is saturated (i.e., transversally stable) and a straightforward calculation veries that this
unique Nash equilibrium is x^3 (Both absent strategies [e3; f1] and [e3; f2] yield the payo
 0:0072 < 0). Although the initial population x0 is close to the saturated xed point
x^3, simulations suggest that the orbit does not converge to F 3; instead e3 is regularly
reintroduced, (see Fig. 1.6). We will further discuss the cause and the consequences of
these non-trivial oscillations in the last section.
1.6 Recombination
Classical replicator dynamics does not introduce new strategies (see Hofbauer and Sig-
mund, 1998). For example, [e1; f1] remains absent if it is not played in the initial popu-
lation even if both pure actions e1 and f1 exist (e.g. if the initial population consists of
[e1; f2] and [e2; f1] players). In this section we introduce recombination, thereby extending
3In general, one needs to be cautious with numerical simulations of heteroclinic cycles, where orbits
converge to the boundary and the relevant fractions xij(t) may well fall below the machine epsilon "M .
However, in this case, the results seem to be suciently robust to be worth presenting.
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Figure 1.6: Numerical simulations for the game M without stable xed points. The
blue orbit shows the solution of the replicator equation over a time interval of 20,000
units, the red orbit gives the state of the population for the last 5% of this time
interval (which must not be confused with a limit cycle). Note that the dynamics
suggests that none of the pure actions ei or fj goes extinct.
the work of Gaunersdorfer et al. (1991).
We consider a general m  2 role game (A;B) with the actions e1,. . . , em for the
row-player and the actions f1 and f2 for the column-player. Now we modify the replicator
dynamics (1.12) by adding recombination:
_xij = xij 

ij   
  Dij : (1.35)
Here  > 0 is the recombination fraction and Dij := xij   pi(x)  qj(x) is the linkage
disequilibrium (In an innitesimal time interval of length t, the combination [ei; fj ] is
broken up with probability xijt, and formed anew with probability pi(x)  qj(x)t).
Proposition 10 (Convergence to the Wright manifold)
Under the modied replicator equation (1.35), all orbits starting in the interior of the state
space converge to the Wright manifold. On this manifold, the modied and the classical
replicator dynamics coincide.
Proof. In order to simplify notation we write Zk for the expressions Zk2 dened by (1.14).
We will show Z2 ! 1 under the modied replicator dynamics (1.35); all other Zk follow
by a symmetry argument. We have
_Z2
Z2
=    D11=x11 +D22=x22  D12=x12  D21=x21 (1.36)
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It is easy to see that
D11=x11 = 1  p1q1x11 = 1 
(x11++x1n)(x11+x21)
x11
=
= 1  x11        x1n   x21   x12x21x11        x1nx21x11 =
= x22 +   + x2n   1Z2x22        1Znx2n =
= (1  1=Z2)x22 + (1  1=Z3)x23 +   + (1  1=Zn)x2n;
(1.37)
hence
D11=x11 =
Pn
k=1(1  Z1Zk )x2k (1.38)
and analogously
D12=x12 =
Pn
k=1(1  Z2Zk )x2k
D22=x22 =
Pn
k=1(1  ZkZ2 )x1k
D21=x21 =
Pn
k=1(1  ZkZ1 )x1k
(1.39)
Plugging these identities into Eq. (1.36) yields
_Z2
Z2
=  (Z2   1)[
nX
k=1
(
x2k
Zk
+
x1kZk
Z1Z2
)] =  (Z2   1)[p1x21
x11
+ p2
x12
x22
]; (1.40)
which shows that Z2 (and therefore all Zk) converge to 1 monotonically. In this case it
follows from Eqs. (1.38) and (1.39) that Dij ! 0.
1.7 Discussion
In this introductory chapter, we have given an overview of the equilibria and the replicator
dynamics of role games. In particular, we have seen that away from the Wright manifold,
role games can induce non-trivial evolutionary oscillations. A similarly peculiar result has
been previously reported by Chamberland and Cressman (2000), who were investigating
a symmetric game with payo matrix:
A =
0B@ 0 6  4 4 0 4
2  2 0
1CA : (1.41)
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For this 3 3-base game of rock-scissors-paper type, all orbits of the replicator dynamics
converge to the unique xed point in the interior. However, for the corresponding role
game (A;AT ), the set of Nash equilibria is unstable. Or, as interpreted by Sandholm
(2006): If players observe commonly the toss of a coin before the game begins, then the
long-run dynamics diers from a game without such a coin toss.
To understand this counterintuitive result, it is important to recall that the replicator
dynamics of a role game promotes strategies that yield a high aggregate payo. Even if the
row-player's strategy ei performs well taken by itself, the fraction of ei-players does not
necessarily increase. Instead, if ei-players tend to use an inferior strategy fj in the role of
the column-player (which is, of course, only possible away from the Wright-manifold), then
pi(x) may decrease. Therefore, the dynamics and the stability of xed points does not
only depend on the game itself but in general also on correlations in the initial population.
Chamberland and Cressman (2000) oer three possible resolutions to avoid these in-
consistencies. The rst suggestion is to restrict attention to the dynamics on the Wright-
manifold. The authors consider this restriction as problematic: In a population of in-
dependent individuals, each playing a pure strategy, there is no reason to assume that
strategy choices are uncorrelated (however, see our convergence result if we allow re-
combination). Secondly, they propose to consider evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS)
instead of Nash equilibria because in the case of ESS, inconsistencies can be excluded
(see Cressman et al., 2000, and note that game (1.41) does not have an ESS). As their
last resolution, Chamberland and Cressman (2000) question the applicability of replicator
dynamics (or any aggregate monotonic selection dynamics) to games with two indepen-
dent decisions. Instead, they suggest to use subgame monotone selection dynamics, where
pi(x)=pk(x) increases if and only if ei yields a higher payo than ek.
This requirement is fullled if we assume that strategy revisions for the two roles of
the base game occur independently:
_pi = pi 

(Aq)i   pTAq

_qj = qj 

(pTB)j   pTBq
 (1.42)
However, one can easily verify that such a dynamics is equivalent to the replicator dynamics
of the corresponding role game, restricted to the Wright-manifold:
_pi(x) =
Pn
j=1 xij

ij(x)  (x)

=
Pn
j=1 pi(x)qj(x)
h
1
2
 
Aq(x)

i
+ 12
 
p(x)TB

j
  12  p(x)T (A+B)q(x)
i
= 12pi(x) 
h 
Aq(x)

i
  p(x)TAq(x)
i
:
(1.43)
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An analogous calculation holds for _qj(x). In the following applications we will therefore
mostly focus on the dynamics on the Wright-manifold.
Chapter 2
Incentives and Opportunism:
From the carrot to the stick
Abstract
Cooperation in public good games is greatly promoted by positive and negative incentives.
In this paper, we use evolutionary game dynamics to study the evolution of opportunism
(the readiness to be swayed by incentives) and the evolution of trust (the propensity to
cooperate in the absence of information on the co-players). If both positive and nega-
tive incentives are available, evolution leads to a population where defectors are punished
and players cooperate, except when they can get away with defection. Rewarding behav-
ior does not become xed, but can play an essential role in catalyzing the emergence of
cooperation, especially if the information level is low.
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2.1 Introduction
Social dilemmas are obstacles to the evolution of cooperation. Examples such as the Pris-
oner's Dilemma show that self-interested motives can dictate self-defeating moves, and
thus suppress cooperation. Positive and negative incentives (the carrot and the stick)
can both induce cooperation in a population of self-regarding agents (see e.g. Olson, 1965;
Ostrom and Walker, 2003; Sigmund, 2007). The provision of such incentives is costly, how-
ever, and therefore raises a second-order social dilemma. This issue has been addressed
in many papers, particularly for the case of negative incentives. We mention for exam-
ple Yamagishi (1986); Boyd and Richerson (1992); Fehr and Gachter (2002); Walker and
Halloran (2004); Bowles and Gintis (2004); Gardner and West (2004a); Nakamaru and
Iwasa (2006); Sefton et al. (2007); Carpenter (2007); Lehmann et al. (2007a); Kiyonari
and Barclay (2008).
It is easily seen that the eciency of the two types of incentives relies on contrasting
and even complementary circumstances. Indeed, if most players cooperate, then it will
be costly to reward them all, while punishing the few defections will be cheap: often, the
mere threat of a sanction suces (Boyd et al., 2003; Gachter et al., 2008). On the other
hand, if most players defect, then punishing them all will be a costly enterprise, while
rewarding the few cooperators will be cheap. Obviously, therefore, the best policy for
turning a population of defectors into a population of cooperators would be, rst, to use
the carrot, and at some later point, the stick.
In the absence of a proper institution to implement such a policy, members of the
population can take the job onto themselves. But what is their incentive to do so? It
pays only if the threat of a punishment, or the promise of a reward, should turn a co-
player from a defector into a cooperator. Hence, the co-players must be opportunistic,
i.e., prone to be swayed by incentives. In order to impress a co-player, the threat (or
promise) of an incentive must be suciently credible. In the following model, we shall
assume that the credibility is provided by the players' reputation, i.e. by their history,
and thus assume several rounds of the game, not necessarily with the same partner (see
e.g. Sigmund et al., 2001; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Barclay, 2006). Credibility could
alternatively be provided by a verbal commitment, for example. Since mere talk is cheap,
however, such commitments need to be convincing; ultimately, they must be backed up
by actions, and hence again rely on reputation. Whether a player obtains information
about the co-players' previous actions from direct experience, or from witnessing them
at a distance, or hearing about them through gossip, can be left open at this stage. In
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particular, we do not assume repeated rounds between the same two players, but do not
exclude them either. Basically, the carrot or the stick will be applied after the cooperation,
or defection, and hence are forms of targeted reciprocation (while conversely, of course,
the promise to return good with good and bad with bad, can act as an incentive).
In the following, we present a simple game theoretic model to analyze the evolution of
opportunism, and to stress the smooth interplay of positive and negative incentives. The
model is based on a previous paper (Sigmund et al., 2001), which analyses punishment
and reward separately and which presumes opportunistic agents. Here, we show how such
opportunistic agents evolve via social learning, and how rst rewards, then punishment
lead to a society dominated by players who cooperate, except when they expect that they
can get away with defection. Rewards will not become stably established; but they can
play an essential role in the transition to cooperation, especially if the information level
is below a specic threshold. Whenever the benet-to-cost ratio for the reward is larger
than one, the eventual demise of rewarders is surprising, since a homogeneous population
of rewarding cooperators would obtain a higher payo than a homogeneous population of
punishing cooperators. We rst analyze the model by means of the replicator dynamics,
then by means of a stochastic learning model based on the Moran process. Thus both
nite populations and the limiting case of innite populations will be covered. In the
discussion, we study the role of errors, compare our results with experiments and point
out the need to consider a wider role for incentives.
2.2 The model
Each round of the game consists of two stages, a helping stage and an incentive stage.
Individuals in the population are randomly paired. A dice decides who is in the role of
the (potential) Donor, and who is Recipient. In the rst stage, Donors may transfer a
benet b to their Recipients, at their own cost c, or they may refuse to do so. These two
alternatives are denoted by C (for cooperation) resp. D (for defection). In the second
stage, Recipients can reward their Donors, or punish them, or refuse to react. If rewarded,
Donors receive an amount ; if punished, they must part with that amount ; in both
cases, Recipients must pay an amount , since both rewarding and punishing is costly.
As usual, we assume that c < b, as well as c <  and  < b. Using the same parameter
values  and  for both types of incentives is done for convenience only: basically, all that
matters are the inequalities. They ensure that Donors are better o by choosing C, if their
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Recipients use an incentive; and that in the case of rewards, both players have a positive
payo. But material interests speak against using incentives, since they are costly; and in
the absence of incentives, helping behavior will not evolve.
The four possible moves for the second stage will be denoted by N, to do nothing;
P, to punish defection; R, to reward cooperation; and I, to provide for both types of
incentives, i.e. to punish defection and to reward cooperation. For the rst stage, next to
the two unconditional moves AllC, to always cooperate, and AllD, to always defect, we
also consider the opportunistic move: namely to defect except if prodded by an incentive.
We shall, however, assume that information about the co-player may be incomplete. Let 
denote the probability to know whether the co-player provides an incentive or not, and set
 = 1  . We consider two types of opportunists, who act dierently under uncertainty:
players of type OC defect only if they know that their co-player provides no incentive,
and players of type OD defect except if they know that an incentive will be delivered.
Hence in the absence of information, OC players play C and OD-players D. This yields
sixteen strategies, each given by a pair [i; j], with i 2 MD := fAllC;OC;OD;AllDg
specifying how the player acts as a Donor and j 2MR := fN;P;R; Ig how the player acts
as Recipient. If player I is Donor and player II Recipient, the pair (pI ; pII) of their payo
values is determined by their moves in the corresponding roles. Hence we can describe
these pairs by a 4 4 matrix (a[ij]; b[ij]), see Tab. 2.1.
 N P R I
AllC ( c; b) ( c; b) (   c; b  ) (   c; b  )
OC ( c; b) ( c; b) (   c; b  ) (   c; b  )
OD (0; 0) ( c  ; b  ) ((   c); (b  )) ( (1  2)   c; b  )
AllD (0; 0) ( ; ) (0; 0) ( ; )
Table 2.1: Payos for the helping game with punishment.
This species the payo values for the corresponding symmetrized game, which is
given by a 16  16-matrix. A player using [i; j] against a player using [k; l] is with equal
probability in the role of the Donor or the Recipient and hence obtains as payo (a[i;l] +
b[k;j])=2. The state of the population x = (x[i;j]) is given by the frequencies of the 16
strategies.
There exist a wealth of possible evolutionary dynamics, describing how the frequencies
of the strategies change with time under the inuence of social learning (Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998). We shall consider only one updating mechanism, but stress that the
2.2. THE MODEL 43
results hold in many other cases too. For the learning rule, we shall use the familiar Moran-
like 'death-birth' process (Nowak, 2006a): we thus assume that occasionally, players can
update their strategy by copying the strategy of a 'model', i.e., a player chosen at random
with a probability which is proportional to that player's tness. This tness in turn is
assumed to be a convex combination (1   s)B + sP , where B is a 'baseline tness' (the
same for all players), P is the payo (which depends on the model's strategy, and the state
of the population), and 0  s  1 measures the 'strenght of selection', i.e. the importance
of the game for overall tness. (We shall always assume s small enough to avoid negative
tness values). This learning rule corresponds to a Markov process. The rate for switching
from strategy [k; l] to strategy [i; j] is (1  s)B + sP[i;j], independently of [k; l].
2.2.1 Large populations
The learning rule leads, in the limiting case of an innitely large population, to the repli-
cator equation for the relative frequencies x[ij]: the growth rate of any strategy is given
by the dierence between its payo and the average payo in the population (Hofbauer
and Sigmund, 1998). This yields an ordinary dierential equation which can be analyzed
in a relatively straightforward way, despite being 15-dimensional.
Let us rst note that I is weakly dominated by P, in the sense that I-players never do
better, and sometimes less well, than P-players. Hence, no state where all the strategies
are played can be stationary. The population always evolves towards a region where at
least one strategy is missing. Furthermore, AllC is weakly dominated by OC, and All
D by OD. This allows to reduce the dynamics to lower dimensional cases. Of particular
relevance are the states where only two strategies are present, and where these two strate-
gies prescribe the same move in one of the two stages of the game. The outcome of such
pairwise contests is mostly independent of the parameter values, with three exceptions:
(i) In a homogeneous OC-population, R dominates N if and only if  >

b
:
(ii) In a homogeneous OD-population, P dominates N if and only if  >

b+ 
:
(iii) In a homogeneous OD-population, P dominates R if and only if  > 1=2:
In each case, it is easy to understand why higher reputation will have the correspond-
ing eect. Owing to our assumption  < b, all these thresholds for  lie in the open
interval (0,1).
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One can obtain a good representation of the dynamics by looking at the situations
where there are two alternatives for the rst stage (namely AllD and OC, or AllD and
OD, or OC and OD), and the three alternatives N, P and R for the second stage. In
each such case, the state space of the population can be visualized by a prism. Here,
each of its 'square faces' stands for the set of all mixed populations with only four
strategies present. For instance, if the population consists only of the four strategies
[OC;N]; [OC;R]; [OD;N; ] and [OD;R], then the state corresponds to a point in the
three dimensional simplex spanned by the corresponding four monomorphic populations.
But since the double ratios x[ij]x[kl]=x[il]x[kj] are invariant under the replicator dynamics
(see Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, pp. 122-125), the state cannot leave the correspond-
ing two-dimensional surface, which may be represented by a square. For several pairs
of strategies (such as [OC;P] and [AllC;P], or [AllD;N] and [OD;N]), all populations
which are mixtures of the corresponding two strategies are stationary. There is no selec-
tive force favouring one strategy over the other. We shall assume that in this case, small
random shocks will cause the state to evolve through neutral drift. This implies that
evolution then leads ultimately to [OC;P], and hence to a homogeneous population which
stably cooperates in the most ecient way. Indeed, it is easy to see that no other strategy
can invade a monomorphic [OC;P]-population through selection. The only aw is that
[AllC;P] can enter through neutral drift. Nevertheless, [OC;P] is a Nash equilibrium.
But how can [OC;P] get o the ground? Let us rst consider what happens if the
possibility to play R, i.e. to reward a cooperative move, is excluded. The asocial strategy
[AllD;N] is stable. It can at best be invaded through neutral drift by [OD;N]. If
 > =(b + ), this can in turn be invaded by [OD;P], which then leads to [OC;P].
If  is smaller, however, that path is precluded and the population would remain in an
un-cooperative state. It is in this case that the R-alternative plays an essential role.
By neutral drift, [AllD;R] can invade [AllD;N]. More importantly, [OD;R] dominates
[OD;N], [AllD;R] and [AllD;N]. From [OD;R], the way to [OC;R] and then to [OC;P]
is easy.
The essential step of that evolution occurs in the transition from OD to OC, when
players start cooperating by default, i.e., in the absence of information (see the third
column in Fig. 2.1). If the R-alternative is not available, then for small values of , the
population can be trapped in [OD;N]. But if the R-alternative can be used, it can switch
from [OD;N] to [OD;R]. In a population where the rst move is either OD or OR, and
the second move either N or R, there is a (four-membered) Rock-Paper-Scissors cycle,
one strategy is superseded by the next. There exists a unique stationary state where these
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Figure 2.1: Dynamics of a population consisting of OC and AllD (left column),
AllD and OD (middle column) resp. OC and AllD (right column). Black points
represent Nash-equilibria, white points indicate unstable xed points. The arrows on
the edges indicate the direction of the dynamics if all other strategies are absent. The
orange grid is the manifold that separates initial values with dierent asymptotic be-
haviour. The blue curves represent the typical dynamics for a given initial population.
Parameter values: b = 4; c = 1;  =  = 2 and  = 30% (hence 2b <  <

+b ).
four alternatives are used. We show in the appendix that for  < =2b, this stationary
state cannot be invaded by any strategy using P. But due to the Rock-Paper-Scissors
dynamics, it is inherently unstable. The population will eventually use mostly strategy
[OC;R]. There, the strategy [OC;P] can invade and become xed.
In the competition between [OD;N] and [OC;P], the latter is dominant if and only if
 > (c+)=(c++b) (a condition which is independent of ). If not, then the competition
is bistable, meaning that neither strategy can invade a homogeneous population adopting
the other strategy. An equal mixture of both strategies converges to the pro-social strategy
[OC;P] if and only if (   2c   2b   ) <    2c   . In the case  = , this simply
reduces to  > c=(c+ b). We thus obtain a full classication of the replicator dynamics in
terms of the parameter . The main bifurcation values are 2b <

b+ <

b and
1
2 . These
can be arranged in two ways, depending on whether b < 2 or not. But the basic outcome
is the same in both case (see Fig. 2.1 and the appendix).
It is possible to modify this model by additionally taking into account the recombina-
tion of the traits aecting the rst and the second stage of the game. Indeed, recombination
does not only occur for genetic transmission of strategies, but also for social learning. A
modication of an argument from Gaunersdorfer et al. (1991) allows to show that in this
case, the double ratios x[ij]x[kl]=x[il]x[kj] converge to 1, so that the traits for the rst and
the second stage of the game become statistically independent of each other. Hence the
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previous analysis still holds. In Lehmann et al. (2007b) and Lehmann and Rousset (2009)
it is shown, in contrast, that recombination greatly aects the outcome in a lattice and in
a nite population model without reputational eects.
2.2.2 Small mutation rates
In the case of a nite population of size M , the learning process corresponds to a Markov
chain on a state space which consists of the frequencies of all the strategies (which sum
up to M). The absorbing states correspond to the homogeneous populations: in such a
homogeneous population, imitation cannot introduce any change. If we add to the learning
process a 'mutation rate' (or more precisely, an exploration rate), by assuming that players
can also adopt a strategy by chance, rather than imitation, then the corresponding process
is recurrent (a chain of transitions can lead from every state to every other) and it admits
a unique stationary distribution. This stationary distribution describes the frequencies
of the states in the long run. It is in general laborious to compute, since the number of
possible states grows polynomially in M . However, in the limiting case of a very small
exploration rate (the so-called adiabatic case), we can assume that the population is mostly
in a homogeneous state, and we can compute the transition probabilities between these
states (Nowak, 2006a). This limiting case is based on the assumption that the fate of
mutant (i.e., whether it will be eliminated or xed in the population) is decided before
the next mutation occurs. We can conrm the results from the replicator dynamics. For
simplicity, we conne ourselves to the non-dominated strategies OC, OD, resp. N, P and
R; similar results can be obtained by considering the full strategy space.
In the stationary distribution, the population is dominated by the strategy [OC;P], but
for smaller values of , it needs the presence of the R-alternative to emerge. This becomes
particularly clear if one looks at the transition probabilities (see appendix). Except for
large values of , only the strategy [OD;R] can invade the asocial [OD;N] with a xation
probability which is larger than the neutral xation probability 1=M .
If [OC;P] dominates [OD;N], or when it fares best in an equal mixture of both
strategies, then it needs not the help of R-players to become the most frequent strategy in
the long run (i.e. in the stationary distribution). But for smaller values of , rewards are
essential. In Fig. 2.2, it is shown that that the existence of rewarding strategies allows the
social strategy [OC;P] to supersede the asocial [OD;N] even in cases in which the players
have hardly any information about their co-players. The time until the system leaves
[OD;N] is greatly reduced if rewarding is available (see Fig. 2.3). In the appendix it is
shown that the state [OC;P] is usually reached from [OC;R], while the strategy most likely
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Figure 2.2: Strategy selection in nite and innite populations, depending on the
information parameter . The left column shows the outcome of a simulation of the
replicator equation for 1,000 randomly and independently chosen initial populations.
If only punishment is available to sway opportunistic behaviour then cooperative out-
comes become more likely if  exceeds roughly 1=3 (in which case [OC;P] becomes
xed). As soon as rewards are also allowed, punishment enforced cooperation be-
comes already predominant for  > =2b = 1=4. Additionally, for smaller values of 
the population may tend to cycle between the strategies [OC;R], [OC;N], [OD;N]
and [OD;R], represented by the orange line in the lower left graph.
The right column shows the stationary distribution of strategies in a nite popula-
tion. Again, whitout rewards a considerably higher information level  is necessary to
promote punishment-enforced cooperation (either [OC;P] or [OD;P]; note that the
both opportunists become indistinguishable in the limit case of complete information
as they only dier in the way they play against unknown co-players). In nite pop-
ulations, rewarding states only act as a catalyzer for punishing populations; even for
small , the outcomes [OC;R] resp. [OD;R] are never most abundant.
Parameter values: b = 4; c = 1;  =  = 2. For nite populations we used a popula-
tion size M = 100 and selection strength s = 1=10.
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Figure 2.3: Average number of necessary mutants until a population of [OD;N]
players is successfully invaded. Adding the possibility of rewards decreases the exit
time considerably (for  = 0% it takes 500 mutations with rewards and almost 500,000
mutations without). As the information level increases, this catalytic eect of rewards
disappears. Parameter values: Population size M = 100, selection strength s = 1=10;
b = 4; c = 1;  =  = 2.
to invade the asocial [OD;N] is [OD;R]. These outcomes are robust, and depend little
on the parameter choices. Moreover, they are barely aected by the mutation structure.
If, instead of assuming that all mutations are equally likely, we only allow for mutations
in the behavior in one of the two stages (i.e., no recombination between the corresponding
traits), the result is very similar. Apparently, if it is impossible to mutate directly from
[OD;N] to [OC;P], then the detour via [OD;P] works almost as well.
Even for the limiting case  = 0 (no reputation eects), the role of rewards is strongly
noticeable. Without rewards, the stationary probability of the asocial strategy [OD;N] is
close to 100 percent; with the possibility of rewards, it is considerably reduced.
2.3 Discussion
We have analyzed a two-person, two-stages game. It is well-known that it corresponds to
a simplied version of the Ultimatum game (Guth et al., 1982), in the punishment case,
or of the Trust game (Berg et al., 1995), in the reward case (De Silva and Sigmund, 2009;
Sigmund, 2010). Similar results also hold for the N-person public good game with reward
and punishment (e.g. Hauert et al., 2004). However, the many-person game oers a wealth
of variants having an interest of their own (as, for instance, when players decide to mete
out punishment only if they have a majority on their side; see Boyd et al., 2010). In this
paper, we have opted for the simplest set-up and considered pairwise interactions only.
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In classical economic thought, positive and negative incentives have often been treated
on equal footing, so to speak (Olson, 1965). In evolutionary game theory, punishing is
studied much more frequently than rewarding. The relevance of positive incentives is
sometimes queried, on the ground that helping behavior makes only sense if there is an
asymmetry in resource level between donor and recipient. If A has a high pile of wood,
and B has no fuel, A can give some wood away at little cost, and provide a large benet
to B. This is the cooperative act. Where is the positive incentive? It would be absurd to
imagine that B rewards A by returning the fuel. But B can reward A by donating some
other resource, such as food, or re, which A is lacking.
In experimental economics, punishing behavior has been studied considerably more
often than rewarding behavior (Yamagishi, 1986; Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Barclay, 2006;
Dreber et al., 2008). In the last few years, there has been a substantial amount of empirical
work on the interplay of the two forms of incentives (Andreoni et al., 2003; Rockenbach
and Milinski, 2006; Sefton et al., 2007). The results, with two exceptions to be discussed
presently, conrm our theoretical conclusion: punishment is the more lasting factor, but
the combination of reward and punishment works best. This outcome is somewhat sur-
prising, because in most experiments, players are anonymous and know that they cannot
build up a reputation. One signicant exception is the investigation, in Fehr and Fis-
chbacher (2003), of the Ultimatum game, which has essentially the same structure as our
two-stage game with punishment. In that case, the treatment without information on the
co-player's past behavior yields a noticeably lower level of cooperation than the treatment
with information. Nevertheless, even in the no-information treatment, both the level of
cooperation (in the form of fair sharing) and of punishment (in the form of rejection of
small oers) are remarkably high.
A serious criticism of the model presented in this paper is thus that it does not seem to
account for the pro-social behavior shown by players who know that reputation-building is
impossible. We believe that this eect is due to a mal-adaptation. Our evolutionary past
has not prepared us to expect anonymity. In hunter-gatherer societies and in rural life, it is
not often that one can really be sure to be unobserved. Even in modern life, the long phase
of childhood is usually spent under the watchful eyes of parents, educators or age-peers.
Ingenious experiments uncover our tendency to over-react to the slightest cues indicating
that somebody may be watching (for instance, the mere picture of an eye, see Haley and
Fessler (2005) and Bateson et al. (2006), or three dots representing eyes and mouth, see
Rigdon et al. (2009)). The idea of personal deities scrutinizing our behavior, which seems
to be almost universal, is probably a projection of this deep-seated conviction (Johnson
50 CHAPTER 2. INCENTIVES AND OPPORTUNISM
and Bering, 2006). The concept of conscience was famously described, by Mencken, as
'the inner voice that warns us somebody may be looking' (see Levin, 2009).
In several experimental papers, however, the role of reputation is very explicit. In
Rand et al. (2009), players are engaged in fty rounds of the public good game with
incentives, always with the same three partners. Hence they know the past actions of
their co-players. In this case, we can be sure that  > =b. Thus in a homogeneous
OC-population, R should dominate N. Moreover, as the leverage for both punishment
and reward is 1:3 in this experiment (as in many others), an [OC;R]-population obtains
a payo b  c+    which is substantially larger than that of an [OC;P]-population. In
the experiment, rewarding performs indeed much better than punishing, and Rand et al.
conclude that 'Positive reciprocity should play a larger role than negative reciprocity in
maintaining public cooperation in repeated situations.'
Nevertheless, according to our model, P-players ought to invade. This seems counter-
intuitive. Punishers do not have to pay for an incentive (since everyone cooperates), but
they will nevertheless be rewarded, since they cooperate in the public goods stage. Thus
[OC;P] should take over, thereby lowering the average payo. By contrast, in the repeated
game considered by Rand et al., it is clear that cooperative players who have not been
rewarded by their co-player in the previous round will feel cheated, and stop rewarding
that co-player. They will not be impressed by the fact that the co-player is still providing
an incentive by punishing defectors instead. In other words, in this experiment rewards
are not only seen as incentives, but as contributions in their own right, in a repeated
prisoner's dilemma game. Players will reciprocate not only for the public goods behavior,
but for the 'mutual reward game' too. In fact, if there had been two players only in the
experiment by Rand et al, it would reduce to a repeated prisoner's dilemma game with
100 rounds.
This aspect is not covered in our model, where the incentives are only triggered by the
behavior in the public goods stage, but not by previous incentives. In particular, rewarding
behavior cannot be rewarded, and nes do not elicit counter-punishment. This facilitates
the analysis of incentives as instruments for promoting cooperation, but it obscures the
fact that in real life, incentives have to be viewed as economic exchanges in their own
right.
A similar experiment as in Rand et al. was studied by Milinski et al. (2002), where
essentially the public goods rounds alternate with an indirect reciprocity game (see also
Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004). Helping, in such an indirect reciprocity game, is a form
of reward. In Milinski's experiment, punishment was not allowed, but in Rockenbach and
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Figure 2.4: Stationary distribution in the case of "cheap" incentives. If  < , a
homogeneous population of rewarding cooperators would obtain the maximum payo.
While cooperation can easily be established, players clearly prefer to use the stick
instead of the carrot. Thus, there is only a marginal dierence to the case with
 =  (Fig. 2.2, right column). Parameter values: Population size M = 100, selection
strength s = 1=10; b = 4; c = 1;  = 2;  = 3=4.
Milinski (2006), both types of incentives could be used. Groups were rearranged between
rounds, as players could decide whether to leave or to stay. Players knew each other's past
behavior in the previous public goods rounds and the indirect reciprocity rounds (but not
their punishing behavior). It was thus possible to acquire a reputation as a rewarder,
but not as a punisher. This treatment usually led to a very cooperative outcome, with
punishment focused on the worst cheaters, and a signicant interaction between reward
and punishment.
In our numerical examples, we have usually assumed  = , but stress that this does
not aect the basic outcome (see Fig. 2.4 for the case  < ). In most experiments,
the leverage of the incentive is assumed to be stronger. Clearly, this encourages the
Recipients to use incentives (Carpenter, 2007; Egas and Riedl, 2008; Vyrastekova and van
Soest, 2008). But it has been shown (Carpenter, 2007; Sefton et al., 2007) that many
are willing to punish exploiters even if it reduces their own account by as much as that
of the punished player. In the Trust game, it is also usually assumed that the second
stage is a zero-sum game. In most of the (relatively few) experiments on rewarding, the
leverage is 1:1 (Walker and Halloran, 2004; Sefton et al., 2007); in Rockenbach and Milinski
(2006) and Rand et al. (2009) it is 1:3. In Vyrastekova and van Soest (2008), it is shown
that increasing this leverage makes rewarding more ecient. In our view, it is natural
to assume a high benet-to-cost ratio in the rst stage (the occasion for a public good
game is precisely the situation when mutual help is needed), but it is less essential that
a high leverage also applies in the second stage. Punishment, for instance, can be very
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costly it the other player retaliates, as seems quite natural to expect (at least in pairwise
interactions; in N-person games, sanctions can be inexpensive if the majority punishes a
single cheater).
For the sake of simplicity, we have not considered the probability of errors in imple-
mentation. But it can be checked in a straightforward way that the results are essentially
unchanged if we assume that with a small probability  > 0, an intended donation fails
(either due to a mistake of the player, or to unfavorable conditions). The other type
of errors in implementation (namely helping without wanting it) seems considerably less
plausible. We note that in a homogeneous [OC;P]-population, usually there is no need
to punish co-players, and hence no way of building up a reputation as a punisher. But if
errors in implementation occur, there will be opportunities for punishers to reveal their
true colours. In Sigmund (2010), it is shown that if there are suciently many rounds of
the game, occasional errors will provide enough opportunities for building up a reputation.
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A Classication of the dynamics in large populations
Let us rst analyze a reduced system where all donors are opportunists and where recip-
ients either reward cooperators, punish non-cooperators or do not provide any incentive.
Hence we consider the following extract of the payo matrix:
 N P R
OC ( c; b) ( c; b) (   c; b  )
OD (0; 0) ( c  ; b  ) ((   c); (b  ))
Table 2.2: Payo matrix for the strategies OC, OD, respectively N, P and R.
From this payo matrix we may draw the following conclusions:
(i) In a homogeneous OC population, P always dominates N and R. Additionally, an
R player obtains a higher payo than an N player if and only if b   > b, i.e. i
 > =b (2.1)
(ii) Similarly, in a homogeneous OD population, N is always dominated by R. N is also
dominated by P i b   > 0, i.e. i
 > =(b+ ) (2.2)
P also dominates R i b   > (b  ), i.e. i
 > 1=2 (2.3)
(iii) If incentives are used (P or R), OC dominates OD; in the absence of incentives (N),
this relation is reversed.
In particular, it follows that N is strictly dominated by P if  > =(b + ). Iterated
elimination of strictly dominated strategies then leads to the conclusion that the only
possible outcome of the dynamics is [OC;P].
However, if  < =(b + ) we nd a more interesting behaviour. There is a uniqe
xed point M in the interior of the square spanned by the strategies [OC;N], [OC;R],
[OD;N] and [OD;R]. This xed point is surrounded by spiralling orbits. The asymptotic
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behaviour of these orbits depends on the initial value of
ZNR :=
x[OC;N]  x[OD;R]
x[OC;R]  x[OD;N]
:
If ZNR(0) < 1 all orbits converge to the boundary of the square, whereas ZNR(0) > 1
implies that M is a global attractor. Finally, if ZNR(0) = 1, then M is surrounded by
periodic orbits (see Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). Independently of the initial condition,
a population in this xed point M yield the payo

  b+ c  c2= + b2= ;
whereas both absent strategies, [OC;P] and [OD;P] would obtain the payo
  +   b+ c  c2= + b2= :
Hence, a population in M can be invaded by punishers if and only if
 > =(2b): (2.4)
If we also allow for the strategies AllC andAllD we do not see any additional bifurcations
as the payos of these strategies do not depend on . Hence, the dynamics of the game
is fully described by the thresholds (2.1) - (2.4), which can be arranged in two possible
ways:
(i) If  < b=2, we have 2b <

+b <

b < 1=2
(ii) Otherwise we obtain 2b <

+b < 1=2 <

b
However, both cases induce the same long-term dynamics (see also Fig. 2.5, which
depicts the borderline case  = b=2): For any value of , a population consisting of OC
and AllD evolves either towards punishment enforced cooperation, [OC;P], or towards
a purely selsh regime, [AllD;N] resp. [AllD;R] (Fig. 2.5, rst column). As AllD is
always weakly dominated by its opportunistic counterpart, OD might invade (Fig. 2.5,
second column). In this case the eventual outcome depends on the information level:
If  > =(b + ), [OC;P] mutants succeed in an OD population and lead to stable
cooperation, independently of the additional inequalities  > 1=2 or  > =b (Fig. 2.5,
last two graphs in the last column). For  < =(b + ), however, only the possibility
of rewards allows an OC minority to invade a homogeneous OD population, which may
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lead to oscillations between reward-driven cooperation and defection. If  > =(2b) these
cycles are unstable and open the way for [OC;P] (Fig. 2.5, upper two graphs in the last
column).
 < 
2b
= 1=4

2b
<  < 
+b
= 1=3

+b
<  < 
b
= 1=2
 > 1=2
Figure 2.5: Replicator dynamics for b = 4; c = 1;  =  = 2 and  = 15%; 30%; 45%
resp.  = 60%. The arrows on the edges indicate the direction of the dynamics if all other
strategies are absent. Black points represent Nash-equilibria, white points indicate unstable
xed points. The orange grid is the manifold that separates initial values with dierent
asymptotic behaviour (i.e., a separatrix). The blue curves represent the typical dynamics
for a given initial population.
Note that this choice of parameters implies =b = 1=2; therefore there occur two bifurcations
between the third and the fourth row (in the last row R dominates N in a homogeneous
OC population and P dominates R in a homogeneous OD population). The dynamics in
the interior of the prism, however, is the same no matter whether =b < 1=2 or =b > 1=2.
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B Numerical data for the case of small mutation rates
B.1 Transition probabilities
The transition probabilities for the adiabatic case are calculated according to Nowak
(2006a), see also Sigmund (2010). The following tables (aij) show the xation probabilities
of a mutant i, invading a resident strategy j for dierent values of . For low information
rates, [OD;R] is the only strategy which can invade the asocial [OD;N] with a higher
probability than 1=M (the neutral xation probability).
Parameter values: M = 100; s = 1=10; b = 4; c = 1;  =  = 2.
 = 10% [OC;N] [OC;R] [OC;P] [OD;N] [OD;R] [OD;P]
[OC;N] 0:010 0:162 0:001 0:000 0:068 0:204
[OC;R] 0:000 0:010 0:000 0:000 0:088 0:229
[OC;P] 0:041 0:202 0:010 0:000 0:014 0:085
[OD;N] 0:094 0:074 0:003 0:010 0:003 0:138
[OD;R] 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:023 0:010 0:158
[OD;P] 0:004 0:001 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:010
 = 30% [OC;N] [OC;R] [OC;P] [OD;N] [OD;R] [OD;P]
[OC;N] 0:010 0:082 0:000 0:000 0:015 0:001
[OC;R] 0:000 0:010 0:000 0:005 0:069 0:078
[OC;P] 0:120 0:202 0:010 0:005 0:036 0:066
[OD;N] 0:073 0:018 0:000 0:010 0:002 0:022
[OD;R] 0:006 0:000 0:000 0:060 0:010 0:078
[OD;P] 0:177 0:049 0:000 0:004 0:000 0:010
 = 50% [OC;N] [OC;R] [OC;P] [OD;N] [OD;R] [OD;P]
[OC;N] 0:010 0:011 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
[OC;R] 0:009 0:010 0:000 0:048 0:049 0:001
[OC;P] 0:201 0:202 0:010 0:071 0:072 0:047
[OD;N] 0:052 0:001 0:000 0:010 0:000 0:000
[OD;R] 0:051 0:000 0:000 0:100 0:010 0:009
[OD;P] 0:246 0:137 0:001 0:102 0:011 0:010
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B.2 Typcial transitions between states
For dierent information levels, the following table displays the distribution of strategies
which succeed in invading a homogeneous [OD,N] population. For small information levels
especially, [OD,R] is best at overcoming this asocial state. The table shows the result of
a simulation of the stochastic process with 107 mutations, population size M = 100,
selection strength s = 1=10, b = 4; c = 1;  =  = 2.
[OC;N] [OC;R] [OC;P] [OD;N] [OD;R] [OD;P]
 = 0% 0:000 0:001 0:000   0.999 0:000
 = 10% 0:000 0:003 0:001   0.996 0:000
 = 20% 0:000 0:017 0:011   0.970 0:002
 = 30% 0:000 0:068 0:040   0.858 0:034
 = 40% 0:000 0:191 0:191   0.381 0:238
The next table displays the distribution of strategies which immediately preceded a ho-
mogeneous [OC;P] populations. If there is little information about co-players, the state
of punishing cooperators is mostly reached via rewards (Simulation with 107 mutations,
M = 100; s = 1=10; b = 4; c = 1;  =  = 2).
[OC;N] [OC;R] [OC;P] [OD;N] [OD;R] [OD;P]
 = 0% 0:228 0.644   0:000 0:128 0:000
 = 10% 0:394 0.457   0:002 0:144 0:004
 = 20% 0:234 0.479   0:014 0:212 0:062
 = 30% 0:098 0.419   0:018 0:211 0:254
 = 40% 0:014 0:169   0:008 0:205 0.604
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Chapter 3
Local replicator dynamics: A
simple link between deterministic
and stochastic models of
evolutionary game theory
Abstract
Classical replicator dynamics assumes that individuals play their games and adopt new
strategies on a global level: Each player interacts with a representative sample of the pop-
ulation and if a strategy yields a payo above the average, then it is expected to spread.
In this article we connect evolutionary models for innite and nite populations: While
the population itself is innite, interactions and reproduction occurs in random groups of
size N . Surprisingly, the resulting dynamics simplies to the traditional replicator sys-
tem with a slightly modied payo matrix. The qualitative results, however, mirror the
ndings for nite populations, in which strategies are selected according to a probabilistic
Moran process. In particular we derive a one-third law that holds for any population size.
In this way, we show that the deterministic replicator equation in an innite population
can be used to study the Moran process in a nite population and vice versa. We apply
the results to three examples to shed light on the evolution of cooperation in the iterated
prisoner's dilemma, on risk aversion in coordination games and on the maintenance of
dominated strategies.
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3.1 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory is the appropriate mathematical framework whenever the tness
of an individual does not only depend on its own phenotype but also on the composition of
the whole population (Maynard Smith, 1982; Nowak and Sigmund, 2004). Such biological
interdependencies are wide-spread. Game theoretic models help us to understand molec-
ular biological processes (Pfeier and Schuster, 2005), animal behaviour (Dugatkin and
Reeve, 1998) or plant growth (Falster and Westoby, 2003). Even the evolution of abstract
cultural entities, such as languages (Niyogi, 2006) or norms (Gintis et al., 2005) can be
captured with equations. In this way, mathematical arguments reveal the logic of indirect
speech (Pinker et al., 2008) as well as the origin of moral systems (Uchida and Sigmund,
2010).
The classical approach to evolutionary games is replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker,
1978; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998): When a certain strategy leads to a tness above the
average, then this behaviour is expected to spread. More formally, suppose the individu-
als of a population can choose among n strategies. A player with strategy i, interacting
with a j-player, obtains a payo aij . The relative frequency of i-individuals within the
population is denoted by xi. If we collect these frequencies to a vector x = (x1; : : : ; xn)
T
and the payos to a matrix A = (aij), the expected tness of strategy i can be written as
i(x) := (Ax)i = ai1x1+ : : :+ainxn. Over the whole population, this results in an average
payo of (x) := x  Ax. According to the replicator equation, the fraction of i-players
grows whenever i(x) exceeds (x):
_xi = xi  [(Ax)i   x Ax] (3.1)
The dot above xi on the left hand's side denotes the time derivative, dxi=dt.
There are several reasons for the prominent role of replicator dynamics: Firstly, equa-
tion (3.1) is relatively simple and mathematically well understood (Hofbauer and Sigmund,
2003). It is equivalent to the famous Lotka-Volterra model in population ecology (Hof-
bauer, 1981). Additionally, there are beautiful connections between replicator dynamics
and the concepts of classical game theory (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; Weibull, 1995).
For example, if strategy i is dominated, meaning that there is another strategy which is al-
ways better, then replicator dynamics will lead to the extinction of i. Furthermore, strict
Nash equilibria, i.e. strategies that are optimal against themselves, are asymptotically
stable rest points of equation (3.1).
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The conceptual beauty of replicator dynamics has its price. To be valid, several con-
ditions have to be met: (i) The population is well mixed, meaning that any two players
interact with the same probability. (ii) Before reproduction, individuals play against a
representative sample of the population. (iii) Players may choose among a nite set of
strategies, and (iv) the population needs to be innite.
The game-theoretical toolbox, however, is evolving too. In the last two decades there
have been several attempts to relax the above assumptions. Instead of considering well
mixed populations, various models explore games in which players only interact with
their neighbors on a lattice (Nowak and May, 1992; Durrett and Levin, 1994; Hauert and
Dobeli, 2004; Helbing and Yu, 2009) or on a random graph (Abramson and Kuperman,
2001; Lieberman et al., 2005; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Lehmann et al., 2007a; Szabo and
Fath, 2007; Santos et al., 2008). Additionally, some authors investigated the eect of a
non-representative sample of interaction partners (Sanchez and Cuesta, 2005; Roca et al.,
2006; Traulsen et al., 2007; Wolng and Traulsen, 2009). The introduction of continuous
strategy spaces has led to adaptive dynamics theory (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1994; Geritz
et al., 1998; Dieckmann et al., 2006).
To study the eect of nite populations, Nowak et al. (2004) consider a group of
N individuals who may choose among two strategies, R and M . Evolution takes place
according to a Moran process: In each time step, one randomly chosen individual dies. Its
place is lled with the copy of another member of the population, whereby players with a
high payo have a better chance to be copied. The resulting dynamics is a stochastic birth-
death process. Evolutionary success is measured with xation probabilities. For example,
in a state with R-types only, one may calculate the likelihood that one M -mutant can
invade and take over the whole population. If this probability M!R exceeds 1=N , then
selection favours M replacing R.
There are interesting connections between replicator dynamics and the Moran-process.
For example, in the limit of large populations, the diusion approximation of the Moran-
process converges to a variant of the replicator equation (Traulsen et al., 2005). A more
subtle connection is called the one-third law (Taylor et al., 2004; Ohtsuki et al., 2007a;
Bomze and Pawlowitsch, 2008): Consider a game with payo matrix
R M
R a b
M c d
(3.2)
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For a > c and d > b, replicator dynamics predicts that both pure strategies, R and
M , are evolutionarily stable. Additionally, there is an interior xed point at x = (a  
c)=(a   b   c + d), whereby x denotes the frequency of M -players. For large population
sizes N , it can be shown that selection favours M replacing R if this xed point is below
one third, i.e.
M!R > 1=N , x < 1=3: (3.3)
A similar result holds for risk dominance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988): Strategy M has
the bigger basin of attraction if M has a higher chance to replace R than vice versa:
M!R > R!M , x < 1=2: (3.4)
Even if replicator dynamics and the Moran process are closely related for large pop-
ulations, they can lead to very dierent conclusions if the population size N is small.
Dominated strategies may spread in nite populations (Taylor et al., 2004) and regimes
that are stable according to replicator dynamics may be invaded under the Moran process
and vice versa (Nowak et al., 2004). Therefore, several recent studies have compared the
dynamics in nite respectively innite populations separately, e.g. Imhof et al. (2005) or
Hilbe and Sigmund (2010).
In this paper, we aim to connect both approaches: While the population itself is
innite, individuals interact in randomly formed groups of size N . In each group, one
member may adopt the strategy of a co-player. Strategies that yield a high payo are
more likely to be adopted. After reproduction, groups are formed anew. This scenario
was used by Nakamaru et al. (1997, 1998), Nakamaru and Iwasa (2006) and Rand et al.
(2010) to approximate games on a lattice, in which each player interacts with its N   1
neighbors. Here we show that the resulting dynamics can be described by a modied
replicator equation. Instead of payo matrix A, the modied matrix ~AN = A (A+AT )=N
governs the evolutionary outcome. We refer to this modied system as the local replicator
dynamics. Despite its deterministic nature, the local replicator dynamics strongly mirrors
the ndings for nite populations. We will show that there is a one-to-one map from
the xation probabilities according to the Moran process to the xed points of the local
replicator equation. In particular the one-third rule holds for any population sizeN . Thus,
a simple transformation of the payo matrix allows us to use classical replicator dynamics
to analyze games in nite populations.
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The remainder of this article is organized as follows: In Section 3.2 we derive the
local replicator equation and in Section 3.3 we discuss its properties. In Section 3.4, we
present three examples for the resulting dynamics: First, we show how the evolution of
cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma is inuenced by the size of the group. Then
we provide a simple model for the emergence of risk aversion in a coordination game. In
the last example, we explain how dominated strategies can succeed in nite interaction
neighborhoods. In Section 3.5, we extend our model: Instead of considering a xed N ,
we assume that the size of a given group is a random variable. Still, the dynamics can be
described with the local replicator equation by simply replacing N with a proper mean of
all possible group sizes. In Section 3.6, nally, we give a summary and discussion of our
results.
3.2 Derivation of the local replicator dynamics
We consider an innite population whose individuals are randomly assigned to groups of
equal size. Within their groups, players engage in pairwise interactions that determine
the payo of each individual. More specically, let k be the number of possible strategies
and A = (aij) the payo matrix. For a given group of size N , denote by ni the num-
ber of players with strategy i and by ~n = (n1; :::; nk) the vector of those numbers, with
j~nj := n1 + : : : + nk = N . If individuals interact with every other group member and
self-interactions are excluded, an individual with strategy i yields the average payo
i(~n) =
1
N   1 [n1ai1 + : : :+ (ni   1)aii + : : :+ nkaik] : (3.5)
After these interactions, one group member is chosen at random to compare its payo
with another randomly chosen group member. We follow the update rule in Traulsen
et al. (2005, 2006a) and assume that an i-player adopts the role model's strategy j with
probability
pij =
1
2
+
s
2
j(~n)  i(~n)
max
; (3.6)
where max is the maximum possible payo dierence and 0 < s  1 measures
the strength of selection. For weak selection (s  0), a coin toss essentially determines
whether the role model is imitated; if the selection parameter approaches 1, this decision
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is increasingly biased towards the strategy with higher payo. Since players are selected
randomly for the imitation process, this leads to an expected change in the number of
i-players of
ni =
kX
j=1
ni
N
nj
N
(pji   pij) = s
max
ni
N
[i(~n)  (~n)]: (3.7)
The term (~n) denotes the average payo of all players in the group, (~n) =
Pk
j=1 njj(~n)=N .
By using nj=N instead of nj=(N 1), we have implicitly assumed that players may imitate
themselves (as for example in Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006). However,
if an individual chooses itself as role model, then nothing will change. Overall, this sim-
plication only changes the velocity of evolution but not its direction.
According to Eq. (3.7), the expected change of strategies within a certain group can be
described through a replicator equation with local frequencies ni=N . In order to calculate
the aggregate outcome, we have to sum up over all possible groups with j~nj = N . If
xi denotes the global frequency of strategy i and if groups are formed according to a
multinomial distribution, this results in the following equation for the expected change of
global strategy abundances,
_xi =
X
j~nj=N
N !
n1! ::: nk!
xn11  :::  xnkn 
ni
N

i(~n)  (~n)

; (3.8)
where the constant factor s=max has been ommited since it only aects the timescale of
evolution. We call Eq. (3.8) the local replicator dynamics of the system. In general, the
expression on the right hand's side is laborious to compute: The polynomial has degree N
and the number of summands increases exponentially in the number of strategies k. As it
turns out, this expression can be simplied considerably:
Proposition 1 (A simple representation for the local replicator dynamics)
The local replicator dynamics (3.8) can be rewritten as
_xi = xi 

( ~Ax)i   x  ~Ax

; (3.9)
with ~A := A  A+ATN . As usual, AT denotes the transposed payo matrix.
Proof: See appendix.
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This representation of the local replicator equation can be interpreted by slightly re-
arranging the terms to
_xi = xi 

(Ax)i   (N   2)  x
TAx+ (Ax)i + (A
Tx)i
N

; (3.10)
meaning that a player with strategy i still gets an expected payo of (Ax)i. However,
being an i-player in a nite group of size N leads to a bias in the average payo of the
group, on the one hand due to the own payo (Ax)i and on the other hand due to the
expected inuence on the others' payos (ATx)i.
Consequently, there are two alternative mechanisms that promote the evolution of a
certain strategy under the local replicator dynamics: Strategy i may spread either because
it leads to a high own payo (Ax)i, or because it leads the co-players to have a low payo,
i.e. it decreases (ATx)i. In particular, it may pay o to be spiteful and to diminish the
tness of other group members (see also Nowak et al., 2004). As group size increases, the
impact of spiteful behaviour disappears, since the own inuence on the co-players' payos
becomes negligible. In the limit of innite group sizes, spite becomes completely irrelevant.
In this section we have derived the local replicator dynamics for an imitation process,
where individuals with higher payo are imitated more often than others. One could also
investigate a model in which sucessful players produce more ospring; such an attempt is
shown in the appendix, leading to the same dynamics. Irrespective of its derivation, the
local replicator equation has interesting properties: It connects the results of the Moran
process in nite populations with the classical replicator dynamics in innite populations.
This is shown in the next section.
3.3 Properties of the local replicator dynamics
Representation (3.9) makes it straightforward to derive the properties of the local repli-
cator dynamics: We only have to plug in the values of ~AN = A  (A+AT )=N , to transfer
the well-known results of the classical replicator equation (see, for example, in Hofbauer
and Sigmund, 1998). This is done in the following two propositions:
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Proposition 2 (Analytical properties of the local replicator equation)
(i) The simplex Sk =

(x1; :::; xk) : x1+ :::+ xk = 1
	
and all its subfaces are invariant
under the local replicator dynamics.
(ii) Quotient rule:
_ xi
xj

= xixj 
h
(N   1) (Ax)i (Ax)jN +
(AT x)j (AT x)i
N
i
(iii) In the special case of N = 2, the values of the diagonal entries of A do not inuence
the dynamics.
(iv) For zero sum games (i.e. if A =  AT ) or in the case of innite group sizes (N !
1), the local replicator equation coincides with the classical version.
In applications, it is often important to know which states can be stably established.
To this end, one considers a homogeneous population with strategy R, that is invaded by
a rare mutant with an alternative strategy M . If the evolutionary dynamics leads to the
extinction of any such mutant, then R is called evolutionarily stable or an ESS.
Proposition 3 (Evolutionary Stability)
Consider a game with 2 strategies and payo matrix
R M
R a b
M c d
(3.11)
Let x denote the fraction of M -players in the population. Then the local replicator dynam-
ics can be written as
_x = x(1  x) 

(N   1)c  b  (N   2)a
N
+
(N   2)(a  b  c+ d)
N
x

: (3.12)
In particular, the resident strategy R is (strictly) evolutionarily stable, if
(N   2)a+ b > (N   1)c: (3.13)
Again, this proposition is simply an adapted version of the analogous result for clas-
sical replicator dynamics. Obviously, the above ESS-condition reduces to the usual Nash
condition a > c for innite groups. For nite populations, however, several denitions have
been suggested to capture evolutionary stability, see Wild and Taylor (2004). The condi-
tion (N  2)a+ b > (N  1)c is included, for example, in the denitions of Maynard Smith
(1988) and Schaer (1988). Nowak et al. (2004) suggest an additional ESS-criterion for
nite populations. Beside the above condition that rare mutants have a lower tness than
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the resident type, they require the mutant strategy to have a xation probability lower
than 1=N . When selection is weak (i.e. the impact of the payo in the game has a small
eect on the reproductive success of a strategy), they nd that this xation probability is
approximately given by
M!R =
1
N
+
1
6N
(N   )s; (3.14)
with  = d + 2c   b   2a and  = 2d + b + c   4a. Again, s measures the strength of
selection. Approximation (3.14) is valid if Ns  1 and will be called the weak selection
xation probability. The reverse probability R!M that a single R-mutant reaches xation
in an otherwise homogeneous population of M -players can be derived with a symmetry
argument. Our next aim is to show that there is a strong connection between these xation
probabilities and the local replicator dynamics.
Proposition 4 (One-third law)
Let A =
 
a b
c d
!
and ~AN = A  A+ATN =
 
~a ~b
~c ~d
!
be payo matrices for a game with
two strategies, R and M .
(i) The weak selection xation probabilities of the Moran process with payo matrix A
can be infered from the replicator dynamics of the game with matrix ~AN :
M!R = 1N +
~D
2 (~x
   13)s; R!M = 1N +
~D
2 (
2
3   ~x)s: (3.15)
Here, ~x denotes the xed point of the replicator equation, ~x = (~c ~a)=(~c ~a  ~d+~b),
and ~D denotes the denominator of ~x. In particular, for a bistable competition (~a > ~c
and ~d > ~b), we recover the one-third law for any group size N :
M!R > 1=N , ~x < 1=3
M!R > R!M , ~x < 1=2
(3.16)
(ii) Conversely, if the replicator equation for the game with matrix ~AN has a xed point
~x 2 (0; 1), then it can be calculated using the weak selection xation probabilities of
the Moran process for game A:
~x =
1
3

1 +
M!R   1=N
M!R + R!M   2=N

(3.17)
In this case, the dynamics is bistable if M!R + R!M < 2=N and it leads to coex-
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istence if M!R+R!M > 2=N . If there is no interior xed point, the strategy with
larger xation probability dominates the other.
Proof. (i) The formula for M!R is veried by a straight calculation: Inserting
~a =
N   2
N
a; ~b =
N   1
N
b  1
N
c; ~c =
N   1
N
c  1
N
b and ~d =
N   2
N
d
into the right hand's side leads to the same result as Eq. (3.14). The expression
for R!M follows from a symmetry argument, as the equilibrium frequency of R is
1  ~x instead of ~x.
(ii) Adding up the two equations in (3.15) leads to the relation
~D
2
s = 3 (M!R + R!M   2=N) : (3.18)
Inserting this expression into the formula for M!R in (3.15) gives Eq. (3.17). Addi-
tionally, it follows that ~D = ~c ~a  ~d+~b has the same sign as M!R+R!M  2=N .
Since the xed point ~x 2 (0; 1) exists if and only if (~a  ~c)( ~d ~b) > 0, the inequality
M!R + R!M > 2=N is equivalent to ~c > ~a and ~b > ~d, i.e. to coexistence under
replicator dynamics.
Simply speaking, and under the assumption of weak selection, this means playing a
game A in a nite population of size N is the same as playing the game ~AN in an innite
population. As soon as one knows the evolutionary outcome in one regime, one can deduce
the results of the other. Thus one may use replicator dynamics to study the behaviour of
nite populations (by simply using the transformation A 7! ~AN , see Fig. 3.1). Conversely,
the replicator dynamics of game ~AN can be examined by studying the nite population
dynamics of game A. As a consequence, we will see in examples that the local replicator
dynamics, despite having the form of the classical replicator system, mirrors the ndings
in nite populations. In particular, dominated strategies can prevail.
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Finite
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Game A
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fixation
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Infinite
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Game AN
Dominance,
coexistence,
bistability
Fixed point x*~
~
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A     AN
~
One−third law
Figure 3.1: Connection between replicator dynamics and the Moran process. To
study the game A in a nite population, one may analyze the replicator dynamics of
game ~AN , which we have called the local replicator dynamics of A.
3.4 Examples for the local replicator dynamics
3.4.1 The iterated prisoner's dilemma
In this section we apply our previous results to the iterated prisoner's dilemma (Axelrod,
1984). Suppose that two players may independently decide whether to transfer a benet
b at own costs c to the co-player or not (and b > c). Assume that this game is repeated
with a constant probability !. We distinguish three strategies: All D always refuses
to help, whereas All C always cooperates. The strategy TFT (Tit for Tat) starts with
cooperation and imitates the co-player's previous move in all subsequent rounds. Thus we
get the following average payos per round (for a detailed derivation see Sigmund, 2010):
A All C All D TFT
All C b  c  c b  c
All D b 0 b(1  !)
TFT b  c  c(1  !) b  c
Obviously, the selsh strategy All D is always evolutionarily stable. Because 0 < b   c,
all players in a population of defectors would be better o if everybody cooperated. All
C is unstable; but if the game lasts suciently long (! > c=b), then TFT can resist the
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All D All C
TFT
N=2
All D All C
TFTN=4
All D All C
TFTN=32
Figure 3.2: The iterated prisoner's dilemma for dierent group sizes. If N = 2,
then any player will adopt the All D strategy in the long run: As both other
strategies perform worse than All D in the direct competition, they will usually
adopt the co-player's strategy if this co-player is a defector. Increasing group size N
diminishes this dilemma. As a consequence, cooperation in the iterated prisoner's
dilemma is most likely to evolve in large populations (Parameter values: b = 3, c = 1
and ! = 2=3).
invasion of All D. However, to study the eect of playing in local groups of size N , we
have to consider the modied matrix ~AN which is up to a factor 1=N :
~AN All C All D TFT
All C (N   2)(b  c)  (N   1)c  b (N   2)(b  c)
All D (N   2)b 0 (1  !)(N   1)b+ c
TFT (N   2)(b  c)  (1  !)(N   1)c+ b (N   2)(b  c)
According to the local replicator equation, TFT is stable against invasion of defectors if
and only if
(1  !)(N   1)b+ c < (N   2)(b  c): (3.19)
Therefore, even if the game is frequently repeated (! close to 1), TFT might be unstable
if its interaction neighborhood N is small (note that TFT is never stable for N = 2, see
Fig. 3.2).
3.4.2 Risk aversion in a coordination game
Experiments indicate that people tend to risk-averse decisions (Kahnemann and Tversky,
1979; Holt and Laury, 2002; Platt and Huettel, 2008): A bird in the hand is worth two in
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the bush. As we will see, local replicator dynamics promotes risk-aversion in coordination
games. Consider the following stag hunt game (with r > 0):
A =
 
1 + r 0
r 1
!
Obviously this game has two pure Nash-equilibria. Owing to the higher variance of the
payos of the rst strategy, we will interpret the rst strategy as risk-prone and the second
as risk-averse. As the sum of each row is 1 + r, rational players are exactly indierent
if they know that their co-player chooses each strategy with probability 1=2. Therefore
classical replicator dynamics predicts equal basins of attraction. However, for the local
replicator dynamics we compute
~AN =
1
N
 
(N   2)(1 + r)  r
(N   1)r N   2
!
:
According to this matrix, the risk-averse strategy dominates the risk-prone strategy if
r > N   2 and it has the bigger basin of attraction for r  N   2. Hence the local
replicator dynamics has a clear bias towards the emergence of risk-averse strategies. The
intution behind this result is as follows: Individuals can only imitate a dierent strategy,
if both types of players are present in the group. Therefore a successful strategy has to
perform well in mixed groups, i.e., it has to yield a notable payo against any co-player.
Overall, this eect may promote the emergence of risk-aversion, although a homogeneous
population of risk-prone subjects would yield the highest possible welfare.
In general, coordination to the risk-prone equilibrium is only partly observed in exper-
iments (see, for example Straub, 1995; Friedman, 1996; Battalio et al., 2001) and human
behaviour in coordination games seems to be very sensitive on details of the experimental
setup. For example, Cooper et al. (1990) have shown that even the presence of a third,
dominated strategy can alter the decisions of the subjects considerably.
3.4.3 The dominance paradox
Consider a cooperation game with payos
A =
0B@ C DC 2 + r 1
D 1 + r 0
1CA
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Obviously, there is no social dilemma as the cooperative strategy dominates defective
motives. Replicator dynamics thus predicts a stable population with the highest possible
payo, 2 + r. However, this result may be overturned for the local replicator equation:
~AN =
1
N
 
(N   2)(2 + r) N   2  r
N   2 + (N   1)r 0
!
According to this matrix, the defective strategy dominates cooperation for r > N  
2. Although this result seems highly counterintuitive, it is a direct consequence of the
assumed locality of interaction and replication. To see this, consider the case r = 8,
N = 4, for which the (original) payo matrix becomes
A =
 
10 1
9 0
!
If a group consists of cooperators only, everybody yields a payo of 10; however, there
is no defector in this group who could adopt this highly protable strategy. In a group
consisting of one defector and three cooperators, the average defector's payo sums up
to D = 9, compared to a cooperator's payo of C = (10 + 10 + 1)=3 = 7. As players
imitate strategies with higher payos, it is likely that a cooperator of this group dies and
is substituted by a defector. Similarly, groups with 2 resp. 3 defectors lead to payos
D = 6 and C = 4, resp. to D = 3 and C = 1. Having this in mind, the paradoxical
emergence of defection becomes unsurprising.
It is important to note that this paradox is not restricted to the local replicator dynam-
ics. Instead it is a general phenomenon for payo-dependent imitation processes in nite
populations. To see this, we calculate the weak selection xation probabilities under the
Moran process according to Eq. (3.14) and nd (for N = 4, r = 8 and selection strength
s = 0:1):
D!C = 0:357 > 1=4
C!D = 0:192 < 1=4
(3.20)
Hence, imitation processes in nite populations might induce social dilemmas where the
payo matrix itself does not reveal any problematic issue at rst sight. Note that this
example holds for any population size N as long as r > N   2.
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3.5 Variable group sizes
So far we have assumed that all groups are of the same size. Now we focus on variable
group sizes instead and consider N as a random variable. Hence, in any moment of time
there may be groups of dierent size. The population is well-mixed in the sense, that any
player has the same probability to become a member of a given group, i.e. the average
frequency of strategy i in a group does neither depend on the group size N nor on the
strategy of the co-players. Within any group, strategy updating occurs as described in
the previous sections. In particular, we assume for the moment that in every group there
is exactly one player who updates its strategy. The group size N is distributed according
to the probability mass function f(N). We exclude atomic groups of one player only, i.e.
f(1) = 0. Let  be the harmonic mean of the group sizes N , i.e.  :=
 P1
N=1 f(N)=N
 1
.
Then we get the following generalization for random group sizes:
Proposition 5 (Local replicator dynamics for variable group sizes)
Consider a well-mixed population of players, engaged in pairwise interactions within groups
of random size N . If  <1, then the local replicator equation is given by
_xi = xi 

( ~Ax)i   x  ~Ax

: (3.21)
Proof. Due to Proposition 1 and our assumptions, the local replicator equation of the
system is given by
_xi =
1X
N=2
xi
h
( ~ANx)i   x  ~ANx
i
 f(N); (3.22)
which can be rewritten as
_xi =
P1
N=2 xi
h
A  A+ATN

x

i
  x 

A  A+ATN

x
i
 f(N)
= xi [(Ax)i   x Ax] +
P1
N=2 xi
h
 A+ATN x

i
+ x  A+ATN x
i
 f(N)
= xi [(Ax)i   x Ax]  xi
  
A+AT

x

i
  x   A+AT xP1N=2 f(N)=N
= xi [(Ax)i   x Ax]  xi
h
A+AT
 x

i
  x  A+AT x
i
= xi 

( ~Ax)i   x  ~Ax

:
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To obtain this result, we have assumed that exactly one player per group is allowed to
imitate others. As a consequence, a given player in a large group is less likely to update
its strategy than a player in a small group. Alternatively we could also consider a scenario
where each player is equally likely to compare its payo with others, implying that larger
groups have on average more updating events. A straightforward adaption of the proof
then shows that the harmonic mean needs to be replaced by the arithmetic mean, i.e. in
this case we have  =
P1
N=1Nf(N).
Note that while N had to be an integer,  may be any positive real number with   2.
As a consequence, we may use derivatives to study the eect of group size on the dynamics
of the system. For example, by calculating @~x=@, we may quantify the inuence of  on
equilibrium frequencies.
3.6 Discussion
Instead of the traditional assumption of a well-mixed and innite population, we have stud-
ied a process in which individuals interact and update their strategies in randomly formed
nite groups. On the one hand, such a setting can be interpreted as the mean-eld approx-
imation of a game on a lattice, where each player is connected with its N   1 neighbors
only (as for example in Nakamaru and Iwasa, 2006; Rand et al., 2010). On the other hand,
similar procedures are used to test human behaviour in laboratory experiments, e.g. the
stranger protocol in Fehr and Gachter (2000) or the control treatment in Traulsen et al.
(2010). We have shown that this process can be modelled through a replicator dynamics
with a slightly modied payo matrix.
Recent models for the evolution of cooperation in so-called public good games rather
use a dierent setup. Typically, individuals are assumed to interact in randomly formed
groups, but strategy updating occurs on a global level (e.g in Brandt et al., 2006; Boyd
et al., 2010), leading to classical replicator dynamics. For models of cultural learning, such
a setting can be problematic: While individuals may be able to assess the performance of
their everyday interaction partners, it remains unclear why they compare themselves with
an abstract population average or with random role models they have never encountered
before. From this perspective, local updating seems to be more intuitive. Related issues
for games on graphs are discussed in Ohtsuki et al. (2007b,c).
Irrespective of its derivation, we have shown that local replicator dynamics connects
the Moran process with the classical replicator equation. In the frequently considered case
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of weak selection, any 2x2 game A that is played in a nite population of N players can be
treated as if it was game ~AN , played in an innite population. In this way, local replicator
dynamics provides a comfortable tool to study games in nite populations, especially if
the game under consideration allows more than two strategies. Although there has been
much eort to extend the Moran process to general nxn games (e.g. Fudenberg and Imhof,
2006; Antal et al., 2009; Tarnita et al., 2009), these generalizations typically require the
specication of mutation rates between strategies. Local replicator dynamics, on the other
hand, is immediately dened for any number of strategies and does not involve mutation.
It is important to note, however, that we have focused on games that are played pairwise.
Instead one could also consider games where more than two players are involved. Such
systems show a fascinating behaviour; at the same time they are highly complex. A
rst important step to explore such multi-player games is made by Gokhale and Traulsen
(2010).
The modied matrix that we have studied, ~AN = A  (A+AT )=N , was also obtained
by Lessard (2005) and Lessard and Ladret (2007), who generalized the nite population
results of Nowak et al. (2004). Instead of focusing on interactions between two pure strate-
gies, R and M , they allowed mixed strategies pR and pM (i.e., strategies that randomize
between several pure strategies). For the Moran process they found that selection opposes
pM replacing pR for every pM 6= pR close enough to pR if and only if pR is evolutionarily
stable for the game with payo matrix ~AN (with respect to the replicator dynamics). This
can be regarded as another clue for the strong relationship between the game A in a nite
population and the game ~AN in an innite population.
Interestingly, also games that are played on a graph can be represented by a modi-
ed replicator equation (Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006; Ohtsuki et al., 2007c,b; Ohtsuki and
Nowak, 2008; Nowak et al., 2010). There it is typically assumed that players only interact
with their direct neighbors. According to birth-death updating, individuals with a high
payo are likely to reproduce. The ospring replaces a randomly chosen neighbor. If
each player is surrounded by N neighbors, then Ohtsuki and Nowak (2006) nd that the
dynamics follows a replicator equation with a modied payo matrix A + B, where B
encapsulates the impact of the population structure. The entries of B are given by the
formula
bij :=
aii + aij   aji   ajj
N   2 : (3.23)
To compare this result with our ndings, we multiply the modied matrix ~AN with the
constant factor N=(N   2) (which only aects the timescale of the dynamics). With this
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trick we can write the modied matrix for the local replicator dynamics as the sum of the
payo matrix A and a structure matrix B with
bij :=
aij   aji
N   2 : (3.24)
Thus we get the same structure matrix B, up to the diagonal terms aii and ajj . As Ohtsuki
and Nowak (2006) point out, these terms characterize the eect of assortativeness. In our
model we have assumed a well-mixed population and groups that are formed anew after
each updating event; hence the diagonal terms are missing in the matrix transformation
for the local replicator dynamics. It remains an interesting endeavour, however, to nd a
general rule under which conditions games in structured population can be described with
a modied replicator equation.
Since the correction term in the denition of ~AN is of order 1=N , local replicator
dynamics only results in a minor correction if players interact with a large sample of the
population. However, for small groups there can be considerable dierences, compared to
the classical replicator dynamics. As we have seen, imitation processes in nite populations
may lead to the evolution of dominated strategies. In particular, for the payo matrix
A =
0B@ C DC 10 1
D 9 0
1CA ;
a homogeneous population of defectors is evolutionarily stable if the population size N is
small. This result may be attributed to spite: Playing D instead of C implies a small cost
for oneself, but harms a cooperative co-player considerably. Overall, this may transform a
win-win situation into a lose-lose situation. However, if this game is played in the labora-
tory, I would rather predict a cooperative equilibrium, as not only the whole population
benets from switching to cooperation but also each player individually. This raises the
question whether the local replicator equation (and equivalently, the Moran process) are
good approximations on human strategy updating (for an interesting experiment on that
issue see Traulsen et al., 2010). The dominance paradox, as described above, relies on the
assumption that individuals blindly copy the strategy of co-players with a higher payo,
irrespective of the consequences this might have on the own future payo. Personally, I
believe that individuals have more foresight when they opt for a new strategy. Human
strategy updating involves imitation and calculation and if evolutionary models should
also account for cultural learning, then the game theoretical toolbox has to evolve further.
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A An alternative derivation of the local replicator equation
Local replicator dynamics can also be derived from a birth-death process, instead of im-
itation updating. Again, we assume that players interact within groups of size N . After
those interactions, one player of each group is chosen to reproduce, proportional to its
tness. The ospring replaces a randomly chosen member of the same group.
If di(~n) denotes the probability that a player with strategy i is chosen to die and
bj(~n) is the corresponding probability that an individual with stratey j is born, then the
expected change of players with strategy i within this group ~n is is given by
ni =
 
1  di(~n)
  bi(~n)  di(~n)   1  bi(~n) = bi(~n)  di(~n): (3.25)
The birth probability of an individual depends on its tness fi(~n), which is a sum of
baseline tness (normalized to 1) and the payo of this strategy,
fi(~n) = 1 + si(~n): (3.26)
Hence, if f(~n) denotes the average tness in the group, i.e. fi(~n) =
 
n1f1(~n) + : : : +
nkfk(~n)

=N , the birth probability is given by
bi(~n) =
nifi(~n)
Nf(~n)
: (3.27)
We note that
Pk
i=1 bi(~n) = 1. Players die randomly, irrespective of their payo, and
therefore we may write the death probability as di(~n) =
ni
N . Thus, we may conclude that
ni = bi(~n)  di(~n) = ni
N
fi(~n)  f(~n)
f(~n)
=
ni
N

i(~n)  (~n)
  s+O(s2) (3.28)
Again, we have to sum up these expected changes within one group over all possible groups
of size j~nj = N . In the limit of weak selection, this reproduces the local replicator equation
in the form of Eq. (3.8):
_xi =
X
j~nj=N
N !
n1! ::: nk!
xn11  :::  xnkn 
ni
N

i(~n)  (~n)

: (3.29)
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B Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 (A simple representation for the local replicator dynamics)
The local replicator dynamics (3.29) can be rewritten as
_xi = xi 

( ~Ax)i   x  ~Ax

;
with ~AN = A  A+ATN .
Proof. First we note that the local replicator equation (3.29) can be written as
_xi =
X
j~nj = N
ni  1
N !
n1! ::: nk!
xn11 : : : x
nk
n  niN

i(~n)  (~n)

= xi
X
j~nj = N
ni  1
(N 1)!
n1!:::(ni 1)!:::nk! x
n1
1 : : : x
ni 1
i : : : x
nk
n

i(~n)  (~n)

= xi
X
j~nj=N 1
(N 1)!
n1!:::ni!:::nk!
xn11 : : : x
ni
i : : : x
nk
n

i(~n+i)  (~n+i)

(3.30)
In the last line, the symbol ~n+i denotes a group with ni+1 players with strategy i and nj
players with strategy j 6= i. Accordingly, the last sum is taken over all possible co-players
of an i-player (i.e., over all possible groups with j~nj = N   1 players), while the rst
sum was taken over all possible groups with N individuals. If individuals play against
everybody else in their group, but not against themeselves, the corresponding average
payos are given by:
i(~n+i) =
1
N 1

ai1n1 + :::+ aiini + :::+ aiknk

=
Pk
l=1 ail  nlN 1
j(~n+i) =
1
N 1

aj1n1 + :::+ aji(ni + 1) + :::+ ajj(nj   1):::+ aiknk

=
aji ajj
N 1 +
Pk
l=1 ajl  nlN 1 for j 6= i; nj > 0
(~n+i) =
1
N

n11(~n+i) + :::+ (ni + 1)i(~n+i) + :::+ nkk(~n+i)

= i(~n+i)N +
Pk
j=1 j(~n+i)
nj
N
=
Pk
l=1
ailnl
N(N 1) +
Pk
l;j=1
ajlnlnj
N(N 1) +
Pk
j=1
ajinj
N(N 1)  
Pk
j=1
ajjnj
N(N 1)
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Owing to the properties of the multinomial distribuition, we have
X
j~nj=N 1
(N   1)!
n1!:::nk!
xn11 : : : x
nk
n  nj = (N   1)xj
X
j~nj=N 1
(N   1)!
n1!:::nk!
xn11 : : : x
nk
n  n2j = (N   1)(N   2)x2j + (N   1)xj
X
j~nj=N 1
(N   1)!
n1!:::nk!
xn11 : : : x
nk
n  njnl = (N   1)(N   2)xjxl for j 6= l:
(3.31)
Thus we obtain, due to the linearity of the payos:
X
j~nj=N 1
(N 1)!
n1!:::nk!
xn11 : : : x
nk
n  i(~n+i) =
X
j~nj=N 1
(N 1)!
n1!:::nk!
xn11 : : : x
nk
n 
Pk
j=1 aij  njN 1

=
Pk
j=1
aij
N 1
 X
j~nj=N 1
(N 1)!
n1!:::nk!
xn11 : : : x
nk
n  nj

=
Pk
l=1 aijxj =
 
Ax

i
(3.32)
Analogously we may derive
X
j~nj=N 1
(N 1)!
n1!:::nk!
xn11 : : : x
nk
n  (~n+i) = N 2N
Pk
l;j=1 xlaljxj +
1
N
Pk
j=1 aijxj +
1
N
Pk
j=1 ajixj
= N 2N  xTAx+ 1N
 
Ax

i
+ 1N
 
ATx

i
(3.33)
Eventually we obtain
_xi = xi 
h 
Ax

i
  N 2N  xTAx  1N
 
Ax

i
  1N
 
ATx

i
i
= xi 

( ~Ax)i   xT ~Ax

: (3.34)
Chapter 4
Evolution of cooperation and
punishment in non-anonymous
societies
Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that the mere opportunity to punish others can act as cata-
lyst for cooperative behaviour. It has been argued that humans are equipped with a taste
for punishment, but what is the evolutionary cause for such a taste? Moreover, recent
experiments reveal a problematic side of retribution. A non-negligible fraction of subjects
abuse sanctioning opportunities to engage in spiteful acts (which can harm cooperators,
or everyone) or in revenge (as a response to being punished). Most evolutionary models
neglect these issues, but recently it has been shown that the co-evolution of punishment
and cooperation is dampened, or fully suppressed, if spiteful actions are available. Here we
present a simple game-theoretic approach to show that these negative results hinge on the
unrealistic yet common assumption of anonymous interactions. In our model, individuals
adapt to the reputation of their co-players and learn to behave opportunistically, by coop-
erating against players who punish defectors but saving the cooperation costs otherwise.
This in turn provides an incentive to engage in costly punishment without being spiteful.
To unfold this positive eect, sanctions must neither be too soft nor too severe. Between
these two extremes, punishment is targeted at noncooperators only, and leads to stable
cooperation. These ndings are in line with theories that emphasize the strategic role of
emotions: In non-anonymous societies, anger or vengefulness may partly have evolved to
serve as a credible signal to bystanders.
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4.1 Introduction
Behavioural experiments provide overwhelming evidence that many people are willing to
engage in punishment (Fehr and Gachter, 2002; de Quervain et al., 2004; Rockenbach and
Milinski, 2006; Henrich et al., 2006; Egas and Riedl, 2008; Ostrom et al., 1992). Subjects
punish non-cooperators even if the punishment is costly and even if any direct or indirect
personal benet for the punisher is excluded. Although such experiments are typically
run in completely anonymous environments, reputation eects may play a subtle role.
The mere picture of an eye (Haley and Fessler, 2005) or the physical presence of the ex-
perimenter (Kurzban et al., 2007) can aect the participants' behaviour, often making
them more cooperative or increasing their willingness to punish non-cooperators. It has
been shown that players in the ultimatum game reject unfair oers even when this deci-
sion increases rather than decreases inequity (Yamagishi et al., 2009). While this nding is
counterintuitive under the anonymous conditions of the laboratory, the subjects' behaviour
may be perfectly adapted to the conditions of everyday life, where reputation plays a key
role. Emotions such as anger and vengefulness seem to act as a commitment device; they
help to credibly demonstrate that one is not willing to accept unfair treatments (Frank,
1988).
However, previous research on the co-evolution of cooperation and punishment gives
little weight to reputation. Instead, most evolutionary models tend to mimic the imper-
sonal conditions in the laboratory (Fowler, 2005; Nakamaru and Iwasa, 2006; Lehmann
et al., 2007b; Eldakar and Wilson, 2008; Sigmund et al., 2010; Janssen and Bushman, 2008;
Rand et al., 2010). In these models, punishment acts by reducing the non-cooperators'
payos, thereby preventing the evolutionary spread of defection. We call this the payo
mechanism of punishment. In a recent study, Rand et al. (2010) argue that the payo
mechanism alone cannot maintain cooperation. Indeed, the same conditions that favour
punishment may also promote the evolution of spite, once this possibility is considered.
In our model, punishment does not only aect payos, but also the reputation of a player.
Being known as a person who is willing to pay a cost to take revenge on non-cooperators
may be of advantage in future interactions. As we will show, it is this reputation mecha-
nism that socializes punishment, keeping spite and antisocial punishment at bay.
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4.2 The model
We consider the following pairwise game with two stages (see also Sigmund et al., 2001).
Before the game starts, a coin toss determines which player is in the role of the donor
and which one is in the role of the recipient. In the subsequent helping stage, donors
may transfer a benet b to their recipients, at their own cost c, or they may refuse to
do so. These two alternatives are denoted by C (for cooperation) and D (for defection),
respectively. We make the standard assumption that cooperation is the ecient outcome,
b > c. Then, in the punishment stage, recipients decide whether or not to punish the
donor. Depending on the outcome of the helping stage, there are four possible reactions:
Punishing defectors only (denoted by P for social punishment), punishing cooperators
only (A for antisocial punishment), punishing everybody (S for spiteful punishment) or
nobody (N). If punished, donors have to pay a ne  whereas the recipient is charged
an amount . Because sanctions are costly, immediate self-interest speaks against either
form of punishment.
In order to incorporate reputation, we assume that donors know their co-player's strat-
egy with an exogenous probability . Whether this information comes from previous en-
counters, from observation or gossip can be left open. We can therefore distinguish four
dierent types of donors: AllC-players always cooperate, whereas AllD-players never do
so, regardless of the opponent's reputation. The third type of donor is the opportunistic
cooperator, OC . Donors with this strategy generally cooperate; but if they nd out that
their co-player is not a social punisher P , they decide to save the costs of helping. Finally,
players with strategy OD are non-cooperative except they know they are interacting with
a P -recipient.
We use evolutionary dynamics to study the above game. There exists a wealth of pos-
sible dynamics and each specic choice may aect the result in subtle ways (Nowak et al.,
2010). The traditional approach is to consider a virtually innite population of players.
Each individual acts according to its strategy [i; j], where i 2 fAllC;OC ; OD; AllDg pre-
scribes how to play in the role of a donor and j 2 fP;N;A; Sg prescribes how to react as a
recipient. Classical replicator dynamics(see ref. Sigmund, 2010) assumes that the fraction
of [i; j]-players, xij , evolves according to the following dierential equation:
_xij = xij  [ij   e]: (4.1)
In this equation, ij denotes the average payo of an [i; j]-player, whereas 
e denotes the
mean payo over the whole population. Replicator dynamics thus describes a situation
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where strategies that yield a payo above the global average will spread among the pop-
ulation. However, global competition is an inappropriate model for the evolution of spite
(Gardner and West, 2004b). Instead, such antisocial behaviour can only emerge when
players compete locally and harming others gives a relative advantage to the focal player
(Rand et al., 2010). In order to allow for spite, we therefore assume that players interact
within small and randomly formed groups of size n+ 1. The dynamics of such a scenario
can be captured by the following adapted replicator equation (Hilbe, 2011):
_xij = xij  [ij  
(n  1)e + ij + Tij
n+ 1
]: (4.2)
According to the local replicator dynamics (4.2), a strategy propagates if players adopting
this strategy yield a payo above the group average. Being an [i; j]-player has an inuence
on the mean group payo for two reasons: On the one hand because there is at least one
individual with payo ij . On the other hand the [i; j]-player aects its co-players' payos
by an expected amount denoted by Tij . By taking these two biases into account we obtain
the above dynamics (see also appendix). The most important dierence between (4.1) and
(4.2) is that the latter allows for spite: Under the local replicator dynamics, the frequency
xij increases either by rising the own payo ij or by diminishing the others' payos via
Tij . As group sizes become large, the impact of spite disappears.
4.3 Analysis and results
We rst analyze under which conditions social punishment P is able to maintain coopera-
tion. Traditional analysis suggests that punishment acts as a deterrent if nes exceed the
costs of cooperation,  > c. However, players who compete locally also consider the eect
on the co-players' payos and the respective condition becomes  > min = c+ (b+ )=n.
We can use this condition to eliminate dominated strategies. If  > min it is easy to
verify that opportunists, OC and OD, always perform better than their unconditional
counterparts AllC and AllD: Once information is available, it is optimal to adapt to the
co-player's reputation. On the recipient's side it is safe to reject antisocial-punishment A:
Because players react opportunistically, the reputation mechanism disfavours players who
punish cooperators. On the other hand, the payo mechanism might promote antisocial
behaviour, if punishment is suciently harmful (that is, if =n > ). However, in this
case it is optimal to harm everybody and not cooperators only (Rand et al., 2010), leading
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Figure 4.1: Evolutionarily stable states (ESS) for the helping game with punishment.
We consider which strategies form a stable equilibrium of the evolutionary dynamics,
given that punishment is severe enough to act as a deterrent. Depending on the
parameters b and  there are four dierent scenarios: a) Low values of b and  allow
two stable states, either the welfare maximizing [OC ,P ] or the selsh [OD,N ]. b) If
punishment becomes more severe or if the benet of cooperation rises then [OC ,P ]
is the only ESS. c) Increasing the ne even further destroys the stabilizing eect on
cooperation and no strategy is stable. d) For very large nes, spiteful punishment
takes over (compare these results with Fig. 4.2).
Parameters: c =  = 1,  = 20% and n = 4. For bigger group sizes n, area a and b
grow at the expense of area c and d since spite becomes too costly in large groups.
to spite instead of antisocial punishment.
Let us therefore consider a reduced system, with all donors being opportunists and
recipients being either of type P , N or S. Depending on the intensity of sanctions,
there are four possible evolutionary regimes (Fig. 4.1). A moderate level of benets b and
comparably soft penalties  lead to bistability: If most of the individuals are not willing to
use sanctions initially, then the population will move to a selsh state without punishment
[OD,N ]. However, a population containing a certain baseline number of punishers is
able to maintain mutual cooperation, moving the state to [OC ,P ] (Fig. 4.2a). Note that
all players in a homogeneous [OC ; P ] population cooperate, either by default or because
they anticipate that they would be punished otherwise. Increasing the ne  makes the
inferior equilibrium [OD,N ] disappear and the social [OC ,P ] population becomes globally
attracting. In this parameter region sanctions work best, leading to the optimal welfare
even if both, cooperation and punishment, are initially rare (Fig. 4.2b). A further increase
of  destroys the positive eect of punishment, resulting either in instability (Fig. 4.2c)
or spite (Fig. 4.2d). Here, sanctions cannot maintain cooperation since it is no longer
guaranteed that only selsh individuals are punished. Antisocial behaviour can invade.
To verify this outcome also for the full strategy set and for other evolutionary dy-
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 + b) + c
Figure 4.2: Evolutionary dynamics for the four dierent parameter regions. For each
set of parameters, the strategy space can be represented by a prism. The corners of
the prism mark homogeneous populations, whereas points in the interior correspond
to mixed populations. Blue orbits indicate the dynamics for a given initial population.
a) Both equilibria, [OC ; P ] and [OD; N ] are stable. The orange grid separates ini-
tial populations that converge to the social state [OC ; P ] from those that move to
the inferior equilibrium [OD; N ]. b) [OC ; P ] is globally stable. c) Spiteful punishers
can invade a homogeneous [OC ; P ] population, making punishment enforced coop-
eration unstable. The dynamics exhibits cycles between cooperation and defection,
respectively between spite and social punishment. d) Recipients become fully spite-
ful, moving the population to the detrimental [OD; S] equilibrium.
Parameters: c =  = 1, b = 3=2,  = 20%,  = 1   = 80%, n = 4 and a)  = 2 b)
 = 5 c)  = 8 d)  = 12.
namics, we have run computer simulations that implement the well-known Moran process
(Nowak et al., 2004). We obtain similar results: When reputation eects are suciently
strong, opportunism soon takes over, which in turn promotes the evolution of social pun-
ishment (Fig. 4.3). In the end, a homogeneous population of [OC ,P ] players evolves. These
simulation results are largely independent of the exact modelling of selection (how players
switch to strategies with higher payos) and mutation (how they experiment with new
strategies). For a detailed discussion of the inuence of the parameters, we refer to the
appendix.
4.4 Discussion
Previous evolutionary models cannot explain why individuals learn to deal responsibly
with sanctions. Instead, it is either presumed that punishment is targeted at defectors
only (Boyd et al., 2003; Gardner and West, 2004a; Fowler, 2005; Nakamaru and Iwasa,
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Figure 4.3: Co-evolution of cooperation and punishment over time. A typical
individual-based simulation run of the Moran process shows that opportunists soon
dominate the population (upper graph), which in turn promotes the steady evolution
of social punishment P (lower graph). When the fraction of social punishers exceeds
a certain threshold it pays o to cooperate when in doubt, favouring OC over OD in
the long run.
Parameters: c =  = 1, b = 4,  = 3,  = 30% and population size 160. In each
time step, one individual was selected to imitate another player of the population
and updating occurred according to the so-called Fermi-rule with medium selection
strength, s = 0:5 (see appendix).
2006; Lehmann et al., 2007b; Eldakar and Wilson, 2008; Sigmund et al., 2010; Boyd et al.,
2010), or it is predicted that evolution leads to non-punishing defectors (if  < n) or spite
(if  > n), respectively (Rand et al., 2010). Here we have shown that reputation can re-
solve this puzzle. Under non-anonymity, there is little appeal in harming those who help. If
targeted punishment evolves, then it is systematically directed at non-cooperators. Hence,
we also contradict the popular "folk theorem" that any behaviour, even if abstruse, can
become a common norm as long as deviations are punished (Boyd and Richerson, 1992).
Opportunistic individuals will stop to impose sanctions on pro-social activities, simply
because it is in their own interest to let cooperative outcomes evolve.
As we have shown, opportunism emerges automatically if individuals are able to evalu-
ate the reputation of their opponents. Of course this implies some cognitive requirements
on the subjects: They have to monitor their co-players and need to process and remember
this information properly. For humans, this does not seem to be too restrictive. For ex-
ample, subjects in laboratory experiments show an enhanced memory for faces of cheaters
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(Mealey et al., 1996) and although not tested empirically, one may expect similar results
for punishers. Moreover, it is well-known that humans anticipate the importance of repu-
tation and therefore behave dierently when being observed (Seemmann et al., 2004). But
also in some animal species, individuals are able to distinguish each other's type and to
behave accordingly, as reported in studies of indirect reciprocity - for example for cleaner
shes (Bshary and Grutter, 2006) or for great apes (Russel et al., 2008).
The model that we have proposed is admittedly minimalistic, assuming pairwise in-
teractions and neglecting the possibility of errors. Both assumptions are made to allow
an intuitive analysis and do not qualitatively aect the results. It seems to be a more
serious shortcoming that the model does not incorporate the possibility of retaliation. Es-
pecially in non-anonymous societies it may pay to engage in counter-punishment, thereby
demonstrating that one does not accept opposition. However, a way to address this issue
without increasing the complexity of the model is to ask whether individuals are still will-
ing to punish others, even if counter-punishment is a sure event (that is, even if  = ).
Surprisingly, we nd that counter-punishment prevents spite but still allows for social
punishment. Intuitively, individuals engage in costly vendettas only if this yields some
positive return in form of increased cooperation in future.
Interesting eects are to be expected if we relax the assumption of exogenous infor-
mation and if we consider reputation as a strategic variable. In many circumstances,
subjects may have the choice between explicit and subtle forms of punishment. While
explicit penalties serve as a signal to bystanders, more inconspicuous sanctions minimize
the risk of retaliation. Both emergence and form of punishment are important issues that
can only be understood if their reputational implications are taken into account.
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A Calculation of the payos
We have considered the following four strategies for recipients:
P Social punishment (to punish defectors only)
N No punishment (to punish nobody)
A Anti-social punishment (to punish cooperators only)
S Spite (to punish everybody)
Furthermore, we have distinguished between four dierent strategies for donors:
AllC Unconditional cooperators
OC Opportunistic cooperators (they generally cooperate, except they know they
are not interacting with a P -recipient)
OD Opportunistic defectors (they generally refuse to cooperate, except they know
they are interacting with a P -recipient)
AllD Unconditional defectors
With this specication of the strategies, it is straightforward to calculate the payo for each
player. For example, consider an OC-donor who encounters an N -recipient. With proba-
bility , the donor knows that the recipient does not punish others, in which case it is safe
to refuse cooperation. In the other case, if the donor does not know the recipient's strategy,
OC-donors cooperate by default (which happens with probability  := 1 ). In total, this
yields an average payo of c for theOC-donor and b for theN -recipient. Repeating this
computation for all other strategy pairs yields the following bimatrix (A;B) = (aij ; bij).
In this bimatrix, the rst entry denotes the payo of the donor whereas the second entry
denotes the corresponding payo of the recipient:
 P N A S
AllC
   c; b    c; b    c  ; b      c  ; b  
OC
   c; b    c; b    (c+ ); (b  )    c  ; b  
OD
   c  ; b    0; 0  0; 0)    ; 
AllD
   ;   0; 0  0; 0)    ; 
Table 4.1: Payo matrix for the helping game with punishment
Each individual acts according to its strategy [i; j], where i 2 fAllC; OC ; OD; AllDg
prescribes how to play in the role of a donor and j 2 fP; N; A; Sg prescribes how to react
as a recipient. We assume that individuals have an equal chance to be the donor or the
recipient in a given interaction. Consequently, a player with strategy [i; j] who encounters
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an opponent [k; l] obtains on average
ij;kl := (ail + bkj)=2: (4.3)
B Analysis of the local replicator dynamics
We consider an innite population and denote the fraction of players with strategy [i; j] by
xij . Of course, all these frequencies add up to one,
P
i;j xij = 1. We assume that players
interact in nite groups. Groups are formed randomly and each individual plays against
every other group member. In this case, the expected (normalized) payo of a player with
strategy [i; j] can be calculated as:
ij :=
X
k;l
xkl  ij;kl: (4.4)
Furthermore, we compute the average payo of the whole population by summing up over
all individual payos, yielding:
e :=
X
i;j
xij  ij (4.5)
Classical replicator dynamics asserts that a strategy [i; j] spreads whenever it leads to a
payo above the global average, that is if ij exceeds 
e. However, replicator dynamics
cannot explain why individuals engage in spiteful acts. Spiteful subjects pay a cost (de-
creasing their own payo) to harm others; but since competition is global and because
the population is arbitrarily large, a spiteful subject has a negligible impact on the mean
payo of the population. Global competition is therefore an inappropriate model for the
evolution of spite. Thus we consider the case where players compete locally, assuming
that a strategy spreads if its payo is above the group average. Being an [i; j]-player in
a nite group aects the mean payo of the group for two reasons: On the one hand,
there is at least one player that obtains a payo ij . On the other hand, all other group
members play at least once against an [i; j]-player, leading to an expected inuence on the
co-players' payos of
Tij :=
X
k;l
xkl  kl;ij : (4.6)
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Taking these two eects into account, the average payo of a group containing at least
one [i; j]-player and n randomly chosen other group members is given by
n  1
n+ 1
e +
1
n+ 1
ij +
1
n+ 1
Tij (4.7)
Overall, the assumption of local competition leads to a modied replicator dynamics. The
time evolution of xij is governed by the following equation:
_xij = xij

ij   n  1
n+ 1
e   1
n+ 1
ij   1
n+ 1
Tij

: (4.8)
For a detailed discussion of the analytical properties of this dierential equation, we refer
the reader to Hilbe (2011). There it is also shown that a homogeneous population is
evolutionarily stable with respect to the local replicator dynamics, if and only if it is
stable with respect to the viability model of Nakamaru and Iwasa (2006). This allows us
to compare our results under non-anonymity with the results of Rand et al. (2010).
It is possible to simplify Eq. (4.8). Denote by A = (aij) the matrix that contains
the donor's payos and by B = (bij) the corresponding matrix for the recipient's payos.
Next we dene the two modied payo matrices
~A = A  A+Bn+1
~B = B   A+Bn+1
(4.9)
and compute modied payos ~ij resp. ~
e according to Eqs. (4.3) { (4.5). Then a
straightforward calculation (presented at the end of this section) shows that the local
replicator dynamics (4.8) is equivalent to
_xij = xij [~ij   ~e]: (4.10)
Consequently, the local replicator equation can be written in the form of a classical repli-
cator equation. The system evolves as if the payos were given by ~A and ~B.
Elimination of dominated strategies
When we apply the transformation (4.9) to the helping game with punishment, we obtain
{ up to a factor 1=(n+1) { the modied payo matrices ~A and ~B in (4.13a) resp. (4.13b).
In order to simplify the further analysis, we rst eliminate dominated strategies. By
considering the donor's modied payos in (4.13a) we see that OC always gets, at least,
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the payo of AllC. The dominance relation is not that clear if it comes to the two defective
strategies AllD and OD. According to (4.13a), AllD is weakly dominated by OD if
 nc  n   b+  >  n + : (4.11)
This condition is met if punishment is suciently severe, i.e. if  exceeds the threshold
min := ( + b)=n+ c: (4.12)
For large group sizes the condition  > min simplies to  > c. On the other hand, if
 < min, unconditional defection dominates all other strategies. Hence we interpret min
as the minimum ne to act as a deterrent.
Modied payos for a donor (row player)
~A P N A S
AllC  nc  b  nc  b  nc  n   b+   nc  n   b+ 
OC  nc  b ( nc  b) ( nc  n   b+ )  nc  n   b+ 
OD  nc  n   b+  0 0  n + 
AllD  n +  0 0  n + 
(4.13a)
Modied payos for a recipient (column player)
~B P N A S
AllC nb+ c nb+ c nb  n +  + c nb  n +  + c
OC nb+ c (nb+ c) (nb  n +  + c) nb  n + c+ 
OD nb  n + c+  0 0    n
AllD    n 0 0    n
(4.13b)
On the recipient's side, it is safe to eliminate the anti-social punishment strategy A.
According to (4.13b), A is weakly dominated by N if n >  and weakly dominated by S
whenever n < .
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Evolutionarily stable strategies
Following the observations in the last section we restrict our attention to a system with all
donors being opportunists and all recipients being either of type P , N or S. Our next aim
is to calculate all evolutionarily stable states (ESS) of the reduced system. A homogeneous
population is called evolutionarily stable if rare mutants have a strictly lower payo than
the residents. Since by (4.3) the payo of a strategy [i; j] is a linear combination of the
payo as a donor and the payo as a recipient, strategy [i; j] is an ESS if and only if it is
componentwise stable (that is, neither an [i; l]-mutant nor a [k; j]-mutant can invade).
Let us rst consider when [OC ,P ] is evolutionarily stable. According to (4.13a), [OD,P ]
always has a lower payo than [OC ,P ], provided that  > min: According to (4.13b),
[OC ; P ] can be invaded by [OC ,S] if
nb+ c < nb  n + c+ : (4.14)
Rearranging the terms leads to the conclusion that [OC ,P ] is evolutionarily stable if the
punishment nes are in the interval min <  < n(+b)+c. With similar computations
for all other strategies we get a list of possible ESS, see Tab. 4.2.
The conditions in Tab. 4.2 are presented as Fig. 4.1 in the main text. Note that the
thresholds in the right column of Tab. 4.2 can be ordered as
n(   =b)  =c  n( + b) + c  n( + b) + c (4.15)
We can use these conditions to discuss the inuence of the parameters. Let us start with
the group size n. An increasing group size increases all thresholds in the right column
of Tab. 4.2 and therefore shifts all boundary lines in Fig. 4.1 to the right, except for the
line for  = min. In eect, this leads to an increase of the areas a and b, at the expense
of areas c and d. In the limit n ! 1, which corresponds to the result of the classical
replicator equation, areas c and d disappear completely. In this case, either [OC ; P ] is the
unique ESS (if  < =b) or there are two ESS, namely [OC ; P ] and [OD; N ] (if  > =b).
Spiteful behaviour has vanished, since the costs of a spiteful punisher increase linearly in
n, whereas the detrimental eect on the co-players remains . If groups are suciently
large, it becomes too expensive to be spiteful. Similarly we can explore the eect of all
other parameters; the results are presented in Tab. 4.3.
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Strategy [i; j]
Donor's strategy i
is stable if
Recipient's strategy j
is stable if
Cooperation through punishment [OC ; P ]  > min  < n( + b) + c
Defection through laissez-faire [OD; N ]  > min  < n(   =b)  =c
Defection through spite [OD; S]  > min  > n( + b) + c
Table 4.2: Conditions for evolutionary stability
Parameter Inuence on the dynamics
Group size n Bigger group sizes diminish spiteful behaviour. Areas a and b
increase on the expense of c and d.
Information level  The higher the information level, the more it pays o to punish
defectors to get opportunistic donors to cooperate. Hence area b
increases on the expense of a and c, whereas d remains unchanged.
Costs of cooperation c Increasing costs shift all areas to the right, i.e. it takes higher nes
 to guarantee the same outcome.
Costs of punishing  Increasing punishing fees reduce the danger of spiteful punishment,
shifting c and d to the right. Additionally, individuals may tend to
avoid the costs  completely, i.e. area a increases on the expense
of b.
Table 4.3: Inuence of the parameters. Bold letters refer to the respective parameter
regions in Fig. 4.1 of the main text.
Analysis of the global dynamics
In the previous section we have identied the stable states of the dynamics. Once an
ESS is reached, the population will stay there. In this section we study the evolution
of populations that are not yet in such a stable state. As it turns out, also the global
dynamics can be classied by means of the conditions in Tab. 4.2. In the following we
assume that punishment is severe enough to act as a deterrent,  > min.
If we rst consider the case that  < n(+b)+c, then it follows from payo matrix
(4.13b) that S is dominated by P . Indeed, [OC ; P ] yields a higher payo than [OC ; S]
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and also [OD; P ] performs better than [OD; S]. Therefore, replicator dynamics leads to
the extinction of spite (see Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). In the Figures 4.2a and 4.2b of
the main text, this is graphically indicated by the arrows pointing from S to P for both
possible roles as a donor. On the remaining plane spanned by [OC ,P ], [OC ,N ], [OD,N ] and
[OD,P ], there is either a bistable competition (Fig. 4.2a) or punishment enforced sociality
is globally attracting (Fig. 4.2b).
The other case, in which  > n(+b)+c, can be treated similarly. For this parameter
region, the recipient's strategy N is dominated by S and all evolutionary trajectories ap-
proach the plane that is spanned by [OC ,P ], [OC ,S], [OD,S] and [OD,P ]. There, we either
observe cyclic behaviour (Fig. 4.2c) or convergence to the detrimental [OD,S]-equilibrium
(Fig. 4.2d). The cyclic case is particularly interesting: [OC ,P ]-societies can be subverted
by spiteful individuals with strategy [OC ,S]. But without the specic punishment of defec-
tion, the population evolves towards a state in which individuals defect by default, using
strategy [OD,S]. In this situation, however, it pays o to care for a strict reputation to
guarantee the cooperation of the co-players and [OD ,P ] evolves. As soon as a sucient
number of individuals switches to social punishment P , it is cheaper to cooperate when
in doubt, leading back to [OC ,P ]. Depending on initial conditions, this results either in
innite heteroclinic cycles or it eventually leads to a stable mixture of these four strategies
(Gaunersdorfer et al., 1991).
The case of counter-punishment
Experiments indicate that the option to punish others may lead to long and costly vendet-
tas between players (Nikiforakis, 2008; Denant-Boemont et al., 2007; Herrmann et al.,
2008). The option to retaliate punishment is not explicitly included in our model. A possi-
ble way to address this issue is to add a third stage to the game in which donors may choose
whether or not to punish their recipients. Such an additional counter-punishment-stage
allows for a wealth of new strategies and leads to a considerable increase in complexity.
However, a basic way to incorporate counter-punishment is to assume that punishment
is equally costly for both parties. This assumption models a situation in which counter-
punishment is a sure event. If  = , the minimum ne that acts as a deterrent (given by
Eq. (4.12)) becomes
min =
nc+ b
n  1 : (4.16)
Only if nes exceed this threshold, it is optimal to cooperate in a population of social
punishers, P . Again, the condition  > min simplies to the traditional condition  > c
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Strategy [i; j]
Donor's strategy i
is stable if
Recipient's strategy j
is stable if
Cooperation through punishment [OC ; P ]  > min Always
Defection through laissez-faire [OD; N ]  > min  >

(n 1) (nb+ c)
Table 4.4: Conditions for evolutionary stability if  = .
Case   1n+1 Case  > 1n+1
1 3 5 7 9 11
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Figure 4.4: Evolutionary stability in the case of  = . The left graph depicts
the case of low information ( = 15%), where both [OC ; P ] and [OD; N ] are stable if
 > min. The right graph describes the case of high information ( = 60%); here
we can nd an area where [OC ; P ] is the only ESS. Other parameter values: c = 1,
n = 4.
for large group sizes. The respective conditions for evolutionary stability in the case
of  =  are given in Tab. 4.4. Surprisingly, while counter-punishment still allows for a
stable [OC ; P ]-population, the spiteful state [OD; S] becomes unstable. Intuitively, spiteful
punishment can only evolve because of the payo mechanism, that is if punishment is more
costly for the target than it is for oneself. If counter-punishment is a sure event, then spite
loses its evolutionary advantage.
Fig. 4.4 presents the conditions for evolutionary stability in a   b diagram. We can
distinguish between two cases: If   1=(n+1) (i.e. if on average there is no player whose
reputation is known), then the area where [OD; N ] is an ESS coincides with the area where
[OC ; P ] is an ESS. Only if  >
1
n+1 these two areas dier. The more information about the
co-player's strategy is available, the more easily a population evolves towards the social
[OC ; P ]-state.
B. ANALYSIS OF THE LOCAL REPLICATOR DYNAMICS 97
Local versus classical replicator dynamics
It remains to show that the two representations for the local replicator equation, (4.8)
and (4.10), are equivalent. More specically, we need to prove that the local replicator
dynamics for the game with payo matrices A and B coincides with the classical replicator
dynamics for the game with modied payo matrices ~A = A   (A + B)=(n + 1) and
~B = B   (A+B)=(n+ 1).
First, we calculate the modied payo of a player with strategy [i; j] against a co-player
using strategy [k; l]:
~ij;kl =
~ail+~bkj
2
=

ail ail+biln+1

+

bkj 
akj+bkj
n+1

2
=
ail+bkj
2  
ail+bkj
2(n+1)  
akj+bil
2(n+1)
= ij;kl   1n+1ij;kl   1n+1kl;ij
(4.17)
Summing up over all possible co-players [k; l] thus leads to
~ij =
P
k;l ~ij;kl  xkl
=
P
k;l ij;kl  xkl  
P
k;l
1
n+1ij;kl  xkl  
P
k;l
1
n+1kl;ij  xkl
= ij   1n+1ij   1n+1Tij
(4.18)
For the average payo in the population we nally sum up over all strategies [i; j], leading
to
~e =
P
i;j ~ij  xij
=
P
i;j ij  xij  
P
i;j
1
n+1ij  xij  
P
i;j
1
n+1
T
ij  xij
= e   1n+1e   1n+1e:
(4.19)
Hence we indeed end up with
xij [~ij   ~e] = xij

ij   n  1
n+ 1
e   1
n+ 1
ij   1
n+ 1
Tij

; (4.20)
which proves that the two representations for the local replicator dynamics, (4.8) and
(4.10), are equivalent.
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C Numerical simulations
The previous analysis suggests that under appropriate conditions, opportunism is able to
socialize punishment, which in turn promotes the evolution of cooperation. In order to
verify this prediction, we have run extensive numerical simulations. The protocol of the
simulations follows the lines of the well-known Moran process (Nowak et al., 2004). We
consider a nite population of size n = 160. Each individual of the population plays a
strategy [i; j] with i 2 fAllC; OC ; OD; AllDg and j 2 fP; N; A; Sg. In the initial pop-
ulation all 16 strategies are equally abundant: Each strategy is played by 10 individuals.
We assume that every individual plays against any other member of the population and
thereby obtains a payo that is specied by (4.3) and (4.4).
Afterwards, an evolutionary strategy updating process takes place. Two players, say x
and y with payos x and y, are chosen randomly. Player x adopts the strategy of player
y with a probability that is an increasing function of the payo dierence y   x. A
frequently used parametrization of this transition probability px!y is the so-called Fermi-
rule (Blume, 1993; Szabo and Toke, 1998; Traulsen et al., 2006b):
px!y =
1
1 + exp [ s(y   x)] (4.21)
The parameter s  0 denotes the imitation strength: For small s, a coin toss essentially
decides whether or not to imitate the role model. In the other limit s ! 1, player x
always imitates co-players that have a higher payo. These two limits are usually referred
to as the case of weak and of strong selection, respectively.
Additionally we allow for mutations. In each time step, there is a positive probability
m > 0 that one member of the population is chosen randomly. This member is then
allowed to switch to a dierent strategy, with each of the 16 strategies having an equal
chance to be selected. In the numerical simulations we have assumed a mutation rate
m = 0:001.
We have presented a typical simulation run as Fig. 4.3 of the main text, showing the
rst 10; 000 time steps of the stochastic process. Additionally, we may calculate with which
frequency a given strategy is played in the long run. For this reason, we have simulated
the above selection-mutation process over a period of 2109 time steps (i.e., each of the 160
individuals may implement more than 107 strategy changes). Fig. 4.5 shows the resulting
average frequencies as a function of the selection strength s. We can roughly distinguish
between three dierent scenarios:
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Figure 4.5: Long-run frequencies for the Moran process with mutations. The left
graph shows which strategies are selected by the donors, whereas the right graph
presents the strategy choices of the recipients. Parameter values: c =  = 1, b = 4,
 = 3,  = 30%, m = 0:001 and population size 160.
(i) If selection is strong (s  1), then nearly all of the donors are opportunistic coop-
erators, whereas almost all recipients are social punishers.
(ii) For medium selection strength, (s  1), we still nd that social punishment is the
most abundant strategy among recipients. For donors, we nd a stable coexistence
of unconditional cooperators and opportunistic cooperators. In a population with-
out defectors, both strategies, AllC and OC , perform equally well. However, due to
mutations, a minority of defectors may persist in the population. In such a mixed
population, OC has a slight payo advantage compared to AllC, but the selection
pressure is not strong enough to eliminate AllC completely. On average, the pop-
ulation consists to 2=3 of opportunistic cooperators and to 1=3 of unconditional
altruists.
(iii) Only if selection is weak (s  1) and game payos play a subordinate role on the
strategies that are played, cooperation falls behind: In such a case, all strategies
are played with almost equal shares, but only one out of four of the recipients'
strategies supports cooperation (namely P), whereas the other three actions N, A
and S implicitly promote defection.
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The inuence of the parameters b, c, ,  and  on the results of the Moran process is
similar to their impact on the local replicator dynamics and we therefore omit a detailed
analysis. The mutation rate m has only a minor inuence on the long-run frequencies as
long as mutations are suciently rare (m  1). High mutation rates lead to a situation
where all strategies are almost equally abundant; in this case, the results mirror the
ndings that we have obtained for weak selection (s 1).
Overall, the results of the numerical simulations strongly support our analytical con-
clusions from the previous sections. If players have the opportunity to gain a reputation,
then social punishment is predominant among the population. This in turn promotes the
evolution of cooperation, provided that neither selection is too weak nor that mutations
are too frequent.
Chapter 5
A short note on equilibrium
notions and framing eects
Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that the Nash equilibrium leads to inaccurate predictions of
human behaviour in a vast set of games. This observation has promoted the development
of new solution concepts like the quantal response equilibrium (QRE, see McKelvey and
Palfrey, 1995) or evolutionary equilibria that are based on the long-run performance of a
strategy (Antal et al., 2009; Ohtsuki, 2010). However, it is well-known that the QRE is
subject to framing eects: Duplicating a strategy aects the equilibrium predictions. Here
we show that the above mentioned evolutionary equilibria exhibit the same inconsistency.
Furthermore, we prove that such framing eects are inevitable if a game theoretic solution
concept depends dierentiably on the payos. As a consequence, we argue that dieren-
tiable equilibrium notions, while being of great help in analyzing well-specied games, are
unsuitable for theoretical modeling, where it is not clear which payo matrix gives the
true representation of an economic interaction.
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5.1 Introduction
For any class of games, static or dynamic, with complete or incomplete information, it
is a simple task to create an example where the Nash equilibrium mispredicts human
behaviour, as shown for example in Goeree and Holt (2001). This holds true even for
the most simple games with only one rationalizable equilibrium, like in the traveler's
dilemma introduced by Basu (1994). Suppose that two travelers, returning home from
their vacation, discover that the airline has lost their luggage. The airline asks both trav-
elers independently to make claims for compensation and, in order to prevent excessive
claims, determines that only the lower of both amounts will be paid. Additionally, it is
announced that if the claims are dierent, the person with the lower claim obtains some
reward R > 1, whereas the same amount R will be deducted from the other traveler's re-
imbursement as a penalty. In case that only claims between $180 and $300 are accepted,
the Nash prediction is straightforward: In order to rake in the reward, it is always optimal
to undercut the co-player's claim by one dollar. Consequently, the lower bound of $180
is the unique equilibrium. While this analysis holds true for any R > 1, simple intuition
suggests that subjects in the laboratory may try to coordinate on a higher claim if R is
comparably low.1 Indeed, this intuition is conrmed by experiments: For R = 5, around
80 % of the subjects opt for the maximum claim; only if R is suciently increased, claims
approach the Nash equilibrium outcome (Goeree and Holt, 2001). Seemingly, subjects in
these experiments do not strictly stick to best responses and do not necessarily eliminate
dominated strategies.
These observations are the starting point for several alternative equilibrium notions. In
this article we will review two distinct examples, the quantal response equilibrium (QRE)
of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and the evolutionary equilibrium described in Ohtsuki
(2010). Instead of considering traditional steplike best response correspondences, these
equilibrium notions assume that strategy choices are positively but imperfectly related
to payos.2 As a consequence, also dominated strategies may be played from time to
time, which in turn may aect equilibrium behaviour. Ironically, because these alternative
1As Kaushik Basu (1994) puts it, the strategy pair ("large"; "large") is a Nash equilibrium in ill-
dened categories; if a player is told that the other player will choose a large number and if the reward
R is neglectable, then the best reply is to choose a large number as well. This explanation bears some
similarity with the examples in Camerer and Fehr (2006), who describe under which conditions a minority
of irrational agents can trigger a majority of rational individuals to mimic the minority's behaviour.
2The same idea has also been applied to some learning models, for example smooth ctitious play, see
Fudenberg and Levine (1998).
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equilibrium notions allow a more realistic description of human behaviour, they also have
a serious drawback: These equilibrium notions themselves are subject to framing eects.
Dierent representations of the same economic situation result in dierent predictions. In
particular, giving a strategy a second alias may aect the position of the equilibrium.
We proceed as follows: In the next section, we review the QRE and the evolutionary
equilibrium described in Ohtsuki (2010). We show how two seemingly equivalent games
can lead to diametrically opposed equilibrium predictions. While such framing eects
are well-known in the case of the QRE, they have not been previously reported for the
evolutionary equilibria. In Section 5.3 we give an unexpected sucient condition for
such framing eects: If an equilibrium concept depends dierentiably on the payos then
inconsistencies are inevitable.3 As a consequence it is argued in Section 5.4 that the QRE
and other dierentiable equilibrium notions, although being of great help in analyzing
already specied strategic games, might be unsuitable for doing theory, where the true
representation of an economic problem is far from being clear.
5.2 Examples of equilibrium notions with framing eects
5.2.1 The quantal response equilibrium
The QRE was introduced by Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey, rst for games
in normal form (1995) and later also for extensive form games (1998). Goeree et al.
(2005) provide an axiomatic foundation. Since then, this concept was applied to various
economic settings, including the traveler's dilemma (Capra et al., 1999) or coordination
games (Anderson et al., 2001). Typically, the QRE outplays the Nash equilibrium by far
when it comes to predict human behaviour in laboratory experiments.4 Remarkably, the
QRE can also be used to estimate the rationality of the subjects (McKelvey and Palfrey,
1995) and to which extent they believe in their co-player's rationality (Weizsacker, 2003).
For our purposes, it will be sucient to consider the simplest case, a nite normal
form game between two players. The R-player chooses a row of the matrix M =
 
akl; bkl

,
3Roughly speaking, dierentiability means that small changes of the payos lead to a small and pre-
dictable change of the equilibrium. Note that the Nash equilibrium concept does not satisfy this condition,
since small changes in the payos may completely change the best response correspondences.
4The overwhelming success is illustrated by the following quote of Camerer et al. (2004): Quantal
response equilibrium, a statistical generalization of Nash, almost always explains the deviations from Nash
and should replace Nash as the static benchmark to which other models are routinely compared.
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whereas the C-player chooses a column. As usual, players are allowed to randomize
between their pure actions; we denote by pR and pC the respective mixed strategy vectors.
For each player K 2 fR;Cg, we denote by uKi the expected payo of K's pure action i,
which of course depends on the co-player's strategy p K , that is uKi = u
K
i (p
 K). A main
aspect of the QRE is that choice probabilities are positively but imperfectly related to
payos. According to the most commonly used parametrization of the QRE, the logit
rule, the probability to play action i is determined by the following stochastic reaction
function :
pKi = (u
K
i ) =
exp(  uKi )P
j exp(  uKj )
(5.1)
The sum in the denominator ensures that the probabilities sum up to one. The pa-
rameter  can be interpreted as a measure of rationality:  = 0 means that actions are
chosen randomly from the set of possible alternatives, whereas for large  the choice is
increasingly biased towards the strategy with the highest payo. Note that as long as
 < 1, even dominated strategies get a positive weight. For analyzing data, the param-
eter  is typically estimated using the maximum likelihood method. A logit equilibrium
is then dened as a xed point of the map : A pair of mixed strategies p^ = (p^R; p^C)
is an equilibrium if for both players K 2 fR;Cg and all their strategies i the following
condition holds:
p^Ki = 
 
uKi (p^
 K)

: (5.2)
Such equilibria always exist but need not to be unique. As  goes to innity, logit
equilibria approach Nash equilibria. Furthermore, the graph of all xed points p^ contains a
unique branch, starting at the centroid of the strategy simplex for  = 0 and converging to
a unique Nash equilibrium as  approaches innity, implying that the logit equilibrium can
be applied to the problem of equilibrium selection. Since the stochastic reaction function
 depends dierentiably on the payos for  < 1, by the implicit function theorem the
same holds true for each branch of the graph of the logit equilibria.5
Let us illustrate the logit equilibrium with an example taken from Goeree and Holt
(2001). Consider the following coordination game in which players receive $1.80 for co-
ordinating on the high equilibrium and $0.90 if they coordinate on the low equilibrium.
Additionally, the column-player has an outside option that guarantees a safe payo of
5As we will see in Section 5.3, the smooth dependence on the payos plays a key role. It is valid not
only for the logit equilibrium but for the QRE in general, since stochastic reaction functions are generally
assumed to be dierentiable, see McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) resp. Goeree et al. (2005).
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Figure 5.1: The unique branch of the logit equilibrium for the coordination game
with one, respectively with two outside options (x = 160). a) In the game with one
outside option, the value of x is small enough to enable subjects to coordinate on the
high equilibrium. b) However, if the problem is represented dierently, splitting the
safe option in two, players are predicted to coordinate on the low equilibrium.
$0.40:
L H S
L 90; 90 0; 0 x; 40
H 0; 0 180; 180 0; 40
This game has two pure Nash equilibria, (H;H) and (L;L), and the safe option is never
part of an equilibrium. Nevertheless, as shown in Goeree and Holt (2004), the outside
option has a deciding inuence on coordination behaviour in behavioural experiments.
In particular, the exact value of x controls which strategies are chosen, with suciently
low values of x preferring the (H;H) equilibrium. Such an eect is correctly predicted
by the logit equilibrium but not by the Nash equilibrium, see Fig. 5.1a for an example
with x = 160: The unique branch of the logit equilibrium, starting in the center for  = 0
converges to the high equilibrium in the limit of rational agents, !1. To illustrate that
the QRE is subject to framing eects, we consider the same game, but with the second
player having two (identical) outside options:
L H S1 S2
L 90; 90 0; 0 x; 40 x; 40
H 0; 0 180; 180 0; 40 0; 40
(5.3)
While this additional strategy has no eect on the Nash equilibria, it alters the set
of logit equilibria (Fig. 5.1b): Giving the outside option a second name leads the logit
equilibrium to select the low instead of the high equilibrium. Thus, the prediction of the
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logit equilibrium depends sensitively on the exact formulation of the alternatively possible
strategies.6
5.2.2 Evolutionary equilibria
Ohtsuki (2010) considers the following model of an evolutionary dynamics for an asym-
metric game: There are two populations, a population R of row-players and a population
C of column-players, with population size NR resp. NC . Each player in R chooses a row i
of the matrix M = (akl; bkl) 2 Rmn, whereas each player in C chooses a column j. Then,
every subject in population R plays against every subject in the other population, leading
to the payos uRi and u
C
j , respectively. Subsequently, the tness fi of a player with strat-
egy i is dened by an exponential transformation of its payo, i.e. fKi = exp(u
K
i ) with
K 2 fR;Cg. The factor  measures the importance of the game for the tness of a player
and is usually called the strength of selection. If  ! 0, each agent has approximately the
same tness, a case which is termed the weak selection limit.
After those interactions, one subject (of any of the two populations) is chosen at
random. This agent is allowed to change its strategy by imitating the strategy of another
player of the same population. It is assumed that strategies with higher tness are more
likely to be adopted. More specically, if NRk denotes the current number of row-players
with strategy k, then the probability that a randomly chosen row-player imitates an agent
with strategy i is given by
pRi =
NRi f
R
iP
kN
R
k f
R
k
: (5.5)
Additionally, one allows mutations: With probability u, the agent does not imitate others,
but chooses randomly any of the available strategies.
6In the above example one might argue that the inconsistency can be avoided if identical columns
are omitted by denition. However, if the game is marginally modied such that there are no identical
columns, elimination of the additional column seems unjustied:
L H S1 S2
L 90; 90 0; 0 x; 40 x+ "; 40
H 0; 0 180; 180 0; 40 0; 40
(5.4)
More fundamentally, it is typically not the subjects who construct payo matrices to help them with their
decisions, but it is the researcher who uses such tools to describe the decision maker's behaviour. How
should one decide which matrix gives the true representation of the decision problem? Similarly, to adapt
the argumentation of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) on a related issue, elementary transformations, [like
giving a column a second alias], are irrelevant for correct decision making: after all, the transformed matrix
is just a dierent representation of the same decision problem, and decision theory should not be misled
by representation eects. To hold the opposite point of view is to admit that decision theory is useless in
real-life applications, where problems present themselves without a special formalism.
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Overall, this evolutionary dynamics results in a stochastic selection-mutation process
without absorbing states. In some special cases, it is possible to explicitly calculate the
invariant distribution of the process. One important case is the limit of weak selection, in
which the tness of each individual is largely independent of its payo in the game. As
a consequence, each strategy for population R is approximately played with probability
1=m, only slightly truncated by a term 'i, which reects the impact of the respective
strategy. If both populations are of equal size this term is, up to a multiplicative constant,
given by
'i = ai   a; (5.6)
where ai denotes the average of all feasible payos for a player with strategy i, that is
ai =
P
j aij=n, and a denotes the average of all feasible payos for individuals in population
R, a =
P
i;j aij=(mn).
7 Since this mutation-selection process does not settle down on any
stable state, the deviation terms 'i take the role of the major characteristic of the system.
It is said that selection favors strategy i if 'i is positive (Nowak, 2006a). Furthermore,
one may compare two dierent strategies with each other: Antal et al. (2009) call strategy
i more abundant than strategy k if 'i > 'k. In eect, this approach allows a ranking of
the strategies - based on the long run performance of each strategy in the above described
evolutionary process.
However, it is easy to show that this evolutionary equilibrium exhibits the same framing
eects as the QRE. In fact, calculating ' for the example in the previous section (for
x = 60) yields 'RL =  5 and 'RH = 5 in the case of representation (5.3), respectively
'RL = 3:75 and '
R
H =  3:75 in the case of representation (5.4). Hence, neither does the
absolute value of 'RL allow a consistent assessment across the dierent treatments, nor is
the order of H and L left invariant. In the case of weak selection and uniform mutations,
one can easily determine the reason for this inconsistency: While in the rst representation,
the outside option is played by roughly 1=3 of all column-players, this fraction increases
to approximately 1=2 of the C-population if there are two outside options, which in turn
encourages row-players to choose strategy L.
7This expression for 'i resembles the well-known replicator dynamics, where it is assumed that the
frequency of players with strategy i increases if the payo ui exceeds the average payo in the population
u (see, for example Weibull, 1995). However, while the payos ui and u may vary over time, depending
on the current state of population, the term 'i is constant and does only depend on the payo matrix.
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5.3 An Impossibility Result
Let us turn to the question whether it is possible to construct other equilibrium notions
(or other parametrizations of the QRE, respectively more general evolutionary equilibria)
that avoid the inconsistencies shown in the previous section. For simplicity, we focus on
two-player normal form games and identify each game   with its payo matrix. For this
reason, denote by M = (aij ; bij) : aij ; bij 2 R	 the set of all payo matrices for normal
form games, and let Mk  M be the set of all payo matrices that have exactly k rows
(i.e., that admit k pure strategies for the row-player).
Denition 1 (Assessment formula)
A game theoretic assessment is a function f :Mk ! Rk:
One may interpret each entry of f(M) as the predicted equilibrium frequencies for the
row-player in the normal form game dened by the payo matrix M .8 In particular, note
that the above denition of game theoretic assessments includes the logit equilibrium p^
and the evolutionary assessment ' from the previous section.
In order to exclude framing eects, we demand that equivalent representations of a
game lead to the same assessments. Up to a renumbering of the strategies of the column-
player, we say that two matrices M; M^ 2 Mk are equivalent if they result in the same
matrix after deleting all columns that are a copy of a previous column. More formally,
M  M^ if for all columns j of M there is a column l in M^ such that (aij ; bij) = (a^il; b^il)
for all rows i (and vice versa, for all columns l in M^ there is such a column j in M).
Obviously, this denes an equivalence relation on the set Mk for all k.
Denition 2 (Consistent assessment formulas)
Fix a k  2. An assessment formula f : Mk ! Rk is called consistent if it has the
following properties:
(i) Non-manipulability: If M;K 2Mk and K M then f(K) = f(M).9
(ii) Validity: If the row-player's strategy i is strictly dominated, then i cannot be optimal,
fi(M) < maxj fj(M).
8In this case one can restrict the image of the game theoretic assessment to the unit simplex k instead
of Rk. Since equilibria need not to be unique, this interpretation requires that for each game one particular
equilibrium is selected out of the set of possible equilibria.
9A similar condition can be found, for example, in Milnor's famous work on games against nature, see
Milnor (1951).
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Non-manipulability means that a consistent assessment is well-dened with respect to
the above equivalence relation, i.e. it respects that two matrices M; M^ with M  M^
represent the same game. Validity excludes constant assessment formulas from being
considered. After these preparations, we are able to formulate the main result:
Theorem 3 (An impossibility theorem)
There is no assessment formula that is both, consistent and dierentiable.
Proof. We show the case k = 2: Suppose there is such a consistent and dierentiable
assessment f and consider the arbitrary but xed matrix
M =
"
(a11; b11) (a12; b12)
(a21; b21) (a22; b22)
#
:
Let @f=@ij denote the marginal change of the assessment if the row-player's payo in
the i-th row and the jth column is varied. The idea of the proof is as follows: Non-
manipulability implies that all partial derivatives @f=@ij(M) are zero, which suggests
that the value of f(M) is independent of the values of aij . This in turn contradicts
validity. To show that the derivatives equal zero, we dene the two matrices
M1(t) =
"
(a11 + t; b11) (a12; b12)
(a21; b21) (a22; b22)
#
and
M2(t) =
"
(a11 + t; b11) (a11 + t; b11) (a11 + t; b11) (a12; b12)
(a21; b21) (a21; b21) (a21; b21) (a22; b22)
#
:
M2(t) is obtained from M1(t) by doubling the rst column two times. Note that M1(0) =
M . Next we dene two functions that measure how the respective strategy assessments
vary with t, i.e. we dene ui : R ! Rk with ui(t) = f
 
Mi(t)

for i = 1; 2: Since
M1(t)  M2(t) for all t, non-manipulability implies that u1(t) = u2(t). In particular,
the derivatives for t = 0 coincide:
u01(0) =
@f
@11
(M) =
@f
@11
 
M2(0)

+
@f
@12
 
M2(0)

+
@f
@13
 
M2(0)

= u02(0): (5.7)
Therefore, since we want to show @f=@11(M) = 0, we have to compute the expression
on the right hand's side of (5.7). For this reason, we dene two new matrices:
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M3(t) =
"
(a11; b11) (a11; b11) (a11 + t; b11) (a12; b12)
(a21; b21) (a21; b21) (a21; b21) (a22; b22)
#
and
M4(t) =
"
(a11; b11) (a11 + t; b11) (a11 + t; b11) (a12; b12)
(a21; b21) (a21; b21) (a21; b21) (a22; b22)
#
:
Note that these two matrices have the same reduced normal form and hence are equivalent.
Additionally, they fulll M3(0) = M4(0) = M2(0). If we again dene functions ui(t) =
f
 
Mi(t)

for i = 3; 4, we may conclude that
u03(0) =
@f
@13
 
M2(0)

=
@f
@12
 
M2(0)

+
@f
@13
 
M2(0)

= u04(0); (5.8)
and therefore @f=@12
 
M2(0)

= 0. With a similar calculation one can show that the other
two expressions on the right hand's side of (5.7) , @f=@11
 
M2(0)

and @f=@13
 
M2(0)

,
vanish as well. Therefore, we indeed end up with @f=@11(M) = 0. A symmetry argument
then immediately implies that @f=@ij(M) = 0 for all i and j. As a consequence, the
assessment f(M) does not vary in the row-player's payos, which leads to a contradiction
with the validity of the assessment.
Therefore, we must conclude that there is no reasonable equilibrium concept that is
both, non-manipulable and smooth. If we interpret the value of fi(M) slightly dierently,
as an indicator of the performance of strategy i, then the previous theorem states that is
impossible to measure the success of a strategy with a dierentiable formula.10
In particular, the inconsistencies of the evolutionary assessment ' cannot be simply
attributed to the assumption of weak selection. Even in the case of some positive but nite
selection pressure , the stationary distribution in Ohtsuki (2010) depends dierentiably
on the entries of the payo matrix.
5.4 Discussion
Explaining human behaviour with game theoretic models faces at least two diculties.
Firstly, the modeller does usually not know the exact subjective utilities of the agents;
10Note that the above theorem is sharp in the sense that there exist assessment formulas that are con-
sistent and (Lipschitz-)continuous. As an example, consider the assessment that assigns to each strategy i
its maximum attainable payo, fi(M) = maxj aij .
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instead there might be only some rough estimates. In order to obtain robust results, one
might therefore require that the output of the model depends dierentiably on the input
data. Secondly, in order to set up the model, the researcher needs to choose one specic
description of reality, out of many alternatively possible descriptions. One such choice
might entail, for example, to determine whether a certain player has only one outside
option or several similar options. In the best case - if the methods are consistent in the
sense dened above - the exact representation of the game does not aect the qualitative
results.
However, as we have shown, the two requirements of consistency and dierentiability
are incompatible. If the results of a game theoretic equilibrium notion depend dieren-
tiably on the payos, then these results also depend on the representation. In this sense,
solution concepts for games in strategic form are necessarily imperfect. Therefore any game
theoretic concept that can be applied to normal form games faces the choice whether it
violates one requirement or the other. The matrix presented as Tab. 5.1 attempts to give
an overview over some choices that were made. It classies some popular game theoretic
tools according to whether they violate the smooth dependence on payos condition or the
non-manipulability condition. Of course, such a list is notoriously incomplete and each
cell of this matrix might contain several other elements - with the exception of the cell
that corresponds to the dierentiable and consistent concepts.
A natural question is then to ask which of the two requirements is the more indis-
pensable one. Dierentiable equilibrium notions, and in particular the QRE, are quite
successful in predicting human behaviour for normal form games - once it is known which
representation of the game the subjects choose. In laboratory experiments this is certainly
no problem, since it may be assumed that the players' internal model of the game is close
to the instructions that are provided by the experimenter (in particular it is likely that
all subjects have a similar internal representation). From a behavioural point of view,
the framing eects presented in the previous sections even seem to be a desirable feature
- after all it is well documented that humans are subject to framing eects as well.11
Psychologically, it is not unreasonable to expect that a duplication of the outside option
increases the number of L players in game (5.3). The outside options may act as a coor-
dination device: Because both options point to the low equilibrium, this equilibrium may
be interpreted as a focal point (Schelling, 1960).
However, if it comes to explain human behaviour in the eld it is not at all clear how
11For the related question whether subjects in dynamic games play dierently if confronted with dierent
game trees that represent formally equivalent games, see McKelvey and Palfrey (1998).
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Dierentiable concepts Non-dierentiable concepts
C
on
si
st
en
t
co
n
ce
p
ts
Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950)
Renements of the Nash equilibrium
Perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975)
Proper equilibrium (Myerson, 1978)
Approaches that apply the Nash equilib-
rium to transformed utilities
Fairness model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
Learning processes for which Nash equilib-
ria are rest points
Fictitious play (Brown, 1951)
Replicator dynamics (Taylor and
Jonker, 1978)
Best response dynamics (Gilboa and
Matsui, 1991)
In
co
n
si
st
en
t
co
n
ce
p
ts
Behavioural equilibrium notions
QRE (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995)
Level-k reasoning model (Stahl and Wil-
son, 1995)
Noisy introspection (Goeree and Holt, 2004)
Smooth learning processes
Exponential ctitious play (Fudenberg and
Levine, 1998)
Long run equilibria for evolutionary
processes with uniform mutations and
smooth selection
Moran process (Antal et al., 2009; Ohtsuki,
2010)
Long run equilibria for evolutionary pro-
cesses with uniform mutations and best-
reply selection
Moran process with strong selection (Fu-
denberg et al., 2006)
Table 5.1: A classication of game theoretic concepts
5.4. DISCUSSION 113
individuals perceive their interactions, let alone that these perceptions are comparable
across subjects. For theoretical modeling, the above described framing eects are unde-
sirable (or even dangerous). If an equilibrium concept leads to predictions that depend on
the representation of the game (which is chosen by the modeler himself), then the results
will be somewhat arbitrary in the best case and manipulable in the worst.
A possible solution to avoid framing eects in dierentiable equilibrium notions is
to consider the equivalence class of a game. That is, instead of calculating the logit
equilibrium p^(M) of a game M one may calculate the set of possible logit equilibria
p^([M ]) for all games that are equivalent to M ,
[M ] =
n
M^ 2Mk
 M^ Mo : (5.9)
However, in this case, the logit equilibrium loses its ability to select a unique Nash equi-
librium in the limit of rational agents,  ! 1. Instead, most of the Nash equilibria of
a game M (including all strict Nash equilibria) are predictable by the unique branch of
p^(M^) - if only the game is appropriately framed. Therefore, it seems to me that the
solution concept of the Nash equilibrium is (almost, see Selten, 1975; Myerson, 1978) as
good as it gets.
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Zusammenfassung
Public good games dienen als Modell fur den Konikt zwischen Allgemeinwohl und in-
dividuellem Vorteil: Wahrend der Erfolg eines gemeinschaftlichen Projekts oft vom Ein-
satz aller Beteiligten abhangt, kann fur den Einzelnen der Anreiz zum Trittbrettfahren
bestehen. In dieser Dissertation untersuche ich das Zusammenspiel von Kooperation und
Anreizsystemen mit Hilfe der evolutionaren Spieltheorie. Es wird gezeigt, dass Belohnun-
gen zwar individuelle Kooperation anstoen konnen, dass aber Bestrafungsmoglichkeiten
notwendig sind um die Zusammenarbeit aufrechtzuerhalten. Dabei liefert die individu-
elle Reputation der Spieler einen Anreiz, die Einhaltung von Normen zu uberwachen
und Abweichungen zu sanktionieren. Im Gegensatz zu fruheren Studien werden Bestra-
fungsmechanismen jedoch nicht zur Stabilisierung von beliebigen Normen und Verhal-
tensvorschriften verwendet. Stattdessen werden Sanktionen gezielt dazu eingesetzt um
die soziale Wohlfahrt zu verbessern.
In dieser Dissertation stelle ich auch einige mathematische Werkzeuge und methodische
Konzepte vor, die bei der Untersuchung von public good games hilfreich sind. Dazu wird
die Theorie der Rollenspiele erweitert und eine modizierte Replikatorgleichung eingefuhrt.
Unter dieser lokalen Replikatordynamik konnen sich selbst dominierte Strategien durch-
setzen, falls diese zu einem relativen Vorteil fuhren.
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